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Stanislaw Lesniewski (1886-1939) is called a nominalist, even though 
his published works contain no developed philosophical doctrine. Yet, in order 
to understand and interpret his logical systems, we must understand his 
nominalism. This thesis will investigate, in detail, the philosophical origins of 
the "nominalistic" elements ofLesniewski 1s logical systems and will offer a 
characterization of his nominalism. 
This thesis will provide a brief historical sketch ofLesniewski 1s career as 
a logician and of the times in which his logical systems were developed. A 
definition of nominalism will be developed within the context of the 
realist/nominalist debate over the existence of universals and a realists notion 
of universals will be given as a background against which Lesniewski's 
philosophical beliefs can be measured. The philosophical origins of 
Lesniewski's nominalism will be explored and will provide the basis for an 
examination of the nominalistic elements of his logical systems and the basis 
for a characterization of his nominalism. 
Lesniewski's nominalism avoids traditional classification and can only 
be examined indirectly through an analysis of his logical systems and through 
his attitude towards Russellian classes. In the final analysis, it is best to say 
that Lesniewski was a philosopher who created consistent logical systems in 
which to "talk" about objects. 
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Stanislaw Lesniewski (1886-1939) taught logic at Warsaw University 
between the First and Second World Wars . He developed three logical systems 
- Mereology, Ontology and Protothetic - which he believed would provide a more 
sound basis for mathematics than the other logical systems in use at that 
time, especially the logical system developed by Whitehead and Russell in 
Principia Mathematica. 
Lesniewski is called a nominalist, even though his published works 
contain no developed philosophical doctrine. Yet, in order to understand and 
interpret his logical systems, we must understand his nominalism. This thesis 
will investigate, in detail, the "nominalistic" elements ofLesniewski's logical 
systems and will offer a more precise characterization of his nominalism. 
In order to investigate the origin ofLesniewski's nominalism and to more 
precisely characterize his philosophical tendencies, this thesis will provide a 
brief historical sketch ofLesniewski's career as a logician and of the times in 
which his logical systems were developed. A definition of nominalism will be 
developed within the context of the realist/nominalist debate over the existence 
of universals and a realists notion of universals will be given as a background 
against which Lesniewski's philosophical beliefs can be measured. The 
philosophical origins ofLesniewski's nominalism will be explored and will 
provide the basis for an examination of the nominalistic elements of his logical 
systems and the basis for a characterization of his nominalism. 
1 
Chapter I - Background 
1) A Brief Historical Sketch 1 
Stanislaw Lesniewski was born on March 30, 1886. Although the 
history of his university training is not complete , it is known that he spent at 
least some of his university days in Munich where he attended lectures by 
Hans Cornelius. Lesniewski came to Lvov University in 1910 to study logic 
and completed his doctoral work under the direction ofKazimierz Twardowski 
in 1912. Lesniewski characterized his student days in the following way . 
Steeped in the influence of John Stuart Mill in which I mainly grew up , 
and 'conditioned' by the problems of'universal -grammar' and oflogico-
semantics in the style of Edward Husserl and by the exponents of the 
so-called Austrian School, I ineffectually attacked the foundations of 
'logistic' from this point of view. 2 
Lesniewski was first introduced to modern symbolic logic in 1910 when 
he read Jan Lukasiewicz's 11On The Principle Of Contradiction In Aristotle. 11 
Lesniewski focused on Russell's Paradox involving the 11class of all classes not 
subordinated to themselves" for 11 years (1911 through 1922). During his 
"initial period" (1911 through 1914), Lesniewski published seven papers which 
he later repudiated as immature works . He lived in Moscow during the First 
World War (1915 through 1918). In 1916, Lesniewski's published 
"Foundations of the General Theory of Sets" which can clearly be taken as a 
"bridge between Lesniewski's early and later writings." Lesniewski's mature 
period extended from 1916 until his death in 1939. Lesniewski's most 
important published work, "On the Foundations of Mathematics ," was 
1 The facts in this brief summary of Lesniewski ' philosophical career and his intellectual 
development have been extracted mainly from two sources: Jan Wolenski 's book , Logic And 
Philosophy In the Lvov-Warsaw School , and the Introduction to Stanislaw Lesniewski 
Collected Works. 
2 Stanislaw Lesniewski, "On The Foundations Of Mathematics ", Stanislaw Lesniewski 
Collected Works, Eds . Stanislaw J . Surma , Jan T. Srzednicki , D.I. Barnett , Trans . D. I. 
Barnett , Dordrecht, The Netherlands : Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992 , p. 181. 
2 
published from 1927 through 1931 as a series of journal articles. Lesniewski 
published little in his lifetime. All of his personal papers were destroyed near 
the end of the Second World War. The list of lecture topics Lesniewski 
delivered at Warsaw University from 1919 through 1939 contained on pages 
xii and xiii of"Stanislaw Lesniewski Collected Works" are .a most valuable 
source of information because Lesniewski presented the details of his logical 
discoveries in his lectures. The list of his lectures, therefore, is a helpful outline 
of the development of his logical systems . 
2) Lesniewski's Logical Systems 
Lesniewski developed three logical systems during his mature period: 
Protothetic, Ontology, and Mereology. Lesniewski was not concerned with 
formal semantics 3; his work, therefore, was mainly focused on the syntactic 
development of his logical systems. Because Lesniewski developed a highly 
unique symbolism for his logical systems and, formally, he favored the 
axiomatic development of his systems, his published works are difficult to 
access . In his lectures, however , Lesniewski adopted the more common 
Peano/Russell notation and developed his systems using the method of natural 
deduction . Even though there has been considerable work by others in 
presenting the formal features ofLesniewski 1s logical systems, his logical 
systems are still not as accessible as the logic of Whitehead and Russell. In 
order to understand Lesniewski's logical systems, it is necessary not only ot 
read the literature, but also to actually work with his systems, even if one 
akeady has a familiarity with the logic of Whitehead and Russell . 
The primitive terms ofProtothetic, Ontology, and Mereology are" =", "i/1, 
and "part" ("cz" in Polish), respectively, as well as the quantifier. The axiom(s) 
3 Frederick V. Rickey, ("Interpretations ofLesniewski 's Ontology ", Dialectica, Vol. 39, No. 3 
(1985), pp . 182 through 184.), gives an account of what he believes Lesniewski's informal 
semantics were. 
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of each logical system 11defines 11 the primitive term of that system by its use in 
the axiom(s). The quantifier, however , is not "defined" in the same way; its 
11definition 11 will be the subject of much discussion in the Chapter IV below. 
Protothetic is very similar to a quantified propositional calculus; it is 
based on a single axiom which 11defines 11 equivalence. 
Ontology is similar to a quantified predicate calculus, except that [A] 
a(A) in Whitehead and Russell's system would be written [Aa] (A£ a) in 
Ontology (in my examples, I have used the same shaped variables in order to 
make the comparison more obvious) and, unlike [A] a(A), where 11A11 and 11a11 
refer to two different kinds of things , i.e. objects and their properties 
respectively, 11A11 and 11a11 in Lesniewski's system refer to only one kind of thing, 
namely, objects. Ontology is based on the single axiom: 
[Aa]::AEa.=:.[B] BEA:.[CD] CEADEA.=:).C£D:.[E] E£A.=:).E£a 
A helpful English translation of 11A£a11 might read 11A is the a 11 or 11A is one of the 
a's, 11 but 11A£a11 for Lesniewski is most correctly 11defined 11 by the use of 11£11 in the 
Axiom of Ontology. 
Mereology is a deductive system Lesniewski designed to treat parts and 
wholes . Logically, Mereology is built on Ontology and Ontology is built on 
Protothetic. The order in which Lesniewski constructed these systems, 
however, is just the reverse. As we will see, Lesniewski constructed Mereology 
in order to 11define 11 class as something no different from its members. 
Mereology is not based on a single axiom. It will be sufficient in the 
introduction, however, to present the first axiom ofMereology along with an 
English translation of that axiom. The first axiom ofMereology is : 
[P,Q]:P£cz(Q).=:).Q£N(cz(P)). 
This axiom might most easily be understood if translated into the English 
sentence: 11If Pis one of the parts of Q, then Q is not one of the parts of P. 11 If 
4 
applied to botany , the first axiom of Ontology might be translated by the 
following English sentence : "If a cell is one of the parts of a leaf, then a leaf is 
not one of the parts of a cell." Lesniewski would agree to these translations 
only in so far as they are helpful in understanding the first axiom of Mereology. 
Each logical system "grows," theses are derived, according to directives, 
i.e . very precise rules of transformation/inference, which are directly related to 
the axiom of each logical system through terminological explanations which 
develop the "vocabulary" of the directives through direct reference to the 
axioms of the logical system. Lesniewski's terminological explanations and his 
directives are not proper parts of his logical systems. The shapes of 
parentheses surrounding the variables of all Lesniewski's logical systems 
"mark" the semantic category of expressions which can be substituted for 
those variables . 
Lesniewski's logical systems are carefully constructed to avoid the 
possibility of contradiction and to avoid the lack of precision he detected in 
other logical systems , e.g. the logical systems of Whitehead and Russell , 
Chwistek , Fraenkel, Zermelo and Frege. A good example of Lesniewski's own 
precision is his extended treatment of the use of the turnstile in Whitehead and 
Russell's Principia Mathematica .4 
3) The Polish School Of Logic 
The Polish School of Logic played a significant role in the development of 
logic between the First and the Second World Wars. In their written works 
there is the energy and enthusiasm of people engaged in an important 
intellectual mission. They supported one another; they shared a common 
enthusiasm for discovery; and, most importantly , they did not accept the 
4 Stanislaw Lesniewski , "On the Foundation of Mathematics ", Stanislaw Lesniewski 
Collected Works, Eds . Stanislaw J. Surma, Jan T. Srzednicki , D.I . Barnett , Trans . D. I. 
Barnett, Dordrecht , The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991 , pp . 181 - 196. 
5 
limits of any philosophical doctrine. The tone of the Polish School was mainly a 
result of the influence ofKazimierz Twardowski who was the father of modern 
Polish philosophy. Lesniewski studied with Twardowski and, it seems, was 
imbued with the high standards of precision which Twardowski instilled in all of 
bis students. 
Twardowski also represented a certain moral attitude towards 
philosophy, which he tried to convey to bis disciples. It was bis 
belief that philosophy is the true school of the spirit because it 
creates important moral ideals and defends them. This fact must 
be very strongly emphasized because the ideological unity of the 
Lvov-Warsaw School consisted among other things in a very 
serious treatment of philosophical enquiries and the teaching of 
philosophy, in treating philosophy and its propagation as an 
intellectual and moral mission. 5 
It is easy to detect in Lesniewski's writing the tone of intellectual 
mission Twardowski's students shared. Twardowski succeeded in inspiring 
students with a variety of interests because he did not impose any definite 
philosophical doctrine on them. 
Now Twardowski - and later bis successors - did not impose 
upon bis disciples any definite philosophical doctrine. His primary 
goal was to teach them above all a clear and critical way of 
thinking. It seems that bis philosophical minimalism was an 
intended element of the total conception of building philosophy in 
Poland. 6 
Lesniewski lived in an exciting time for the logicians of the Polish School, 
a time when they believed that it was possible to develop with logic a "general 
theory of existence" 7 or to discover through logic "unshakable and eternal 
truths. 118 The excitement found at the Polish School was not the result of a 
5 Jan Wolenski, Logic And Philosophy In The Lvov-W arsaw School, Dordrecht, The 
Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989, p. 5. 
6 Ibid., p. 5. 
7 Stanislaw Lesniewski, "On The Foundations Of Mathematics", Stanislaw Lesniewski 
Collected Works, Eds. Stanislaw J. Surma, Jan T. Srzednicki, D.I. Brunett, Trans. D. I. 
Brunett, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992, p. 374 . 
8 Jan Lukasiewicz, "In Defence Of Logistic", Jan Lukasiewicz Selected Works, Ed. L. 
Borkowski, Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1970, p . 249 . 
6 
belief that answers to the questions of philosophy are beyond the reach of man, 
but was partially the result of a hope that logic might provide the basis for 
important discoveries with sweeping implications for human knowledge. Even 
though Lesniewski almost completely concentrated his efforts on the 
development of his logical systems in order to provide a consistent logical 
foundation for mathematics and avoided traditional problems of philosophy , 
during his mature period he was still capable of writing : 
.. .I used the name 'ontology'19 to characterize the theory I was 
developing, without offense to my 'linguistic instincts' because I 
was formulating in that theory a certain kind of 'general 
principles of existence' .9 
9 Stanislaw Lesniewski, "On The Foundations Of Mathematics ", Stanislaw Lesniewski 
Collected Works, Eds. Stanislaw J. Surma , Jan T. Srzednicki , D.I. Barnett , Trans. D. I. 
Barnett , Dordrecht , The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992 , p. 374 . 
7 
Chapter II - Towards An Understanding OfNominalism 
Introduction 
This Chapter is intended to build a very general background against 
which Lesniewski's nominalism can be analyzed. 
Eberle, who characterizes Lesniewski as a contemporary nominalist, 
lists eight features of contemporary nominal.ism. 
Although it is difficult to discover views common to all 
contemporary nominalists , the following appear to be 
widespread: (1) criticism of the notion of a class , in as much as a 
class differs from the individual whole composed ofits elements, 
(2) a refusal to postulate the existence of an infinity of objects, 
(3) an aversion to treat predicates as expressions which 
designate non-individuals, (4) objections to the use of such 
entities as concepts, meanings, senses, and propositions in the 
theory of meaning, (5) preference for a syntax where expressions 
are construed as non-repeatable inscriptions , (6) efforts to 
reconstruct or reinterpret portions of mathematics in such a 
fashion that reference to numbers or classes is replaced by 
reference to concrete objects, individual inscriptions, or wholes 
which are determined by their least parts, (7) advocacy of 
parsimony with regard to the number of distinct categories of 
entities to which a theory makes reference, even at the expense 
of greater complexity in the construction of definitions and 
proofs, (8) a tendencyto identify individuals, if possible, with 
phenomenal data or with observable macroscopic things or 
events. Concrete things are preferred to abstract items, actual 
entities to possible ones, occurrent qualities to dispositional ones , 
and observables to theoretical constructs. 10 
The characteristics Eberle chose to highlight are, coincidentally, those 
features of Lesniewski's logical systems which are most often cited as proof of 
his, Lesniewski's, nominalistic inclinations. Yet, although these 
characterizations accurately "define" those nominalistic features, they neither 
describe the origins of Lesniewski's nominalism nor do they define the scope of 
Lesniewski's philosophical nominal.ism. 
10 Rolf A. Eberle , Nominalistic Systems, Dordrecht -Holland: D. Reidel Publishing 
Company , 1970, p . 8. 
8 
It is necessary, therefore, to develop a rough understanding of 
nominalism within the context of the realist/conceptualist/nominalist debate 
over the existence of universals. Aristotle's Theory of Universals will be 
summarized and will be contrasted with Lesniewski's own limited notion of 
universals. And, finally, several points in the nominalist/realist contention over 
the existence of universals will be used to form a limited critical framework 
against which Lesniewski's nominalistic philosophy can be judged. 
1) A Definition OfNominalism 
Nominalism is sometimes defined as "the doctrine that whatever exists 
is a particular, and nothing but a particular." 11 Nominalism can also be defined 
negatively, if 11 ••• by nominalism we mean the view that universals do not 
exist. "12 These definitions do not help to explain what the nominalist takes to 
be a particular, a universal or what he means for something to exist. But, in a 
general way, one can understand from this that the nominalist wants to claim 
that the world is made of only one kind of thing, namely, particulars, that we 
can know these things, and that there are no other things, especially things 
called universals. 
Lesniewski, as·we will see in the next Chapter, Chapter III, never 
expressed his nominalism as a developed philosophical doctrine. As a matter of 
fact, once Lesniewski believed that he could construct logical systems that 
might provide a consistent foundation for mathematics free of the possibility of 
contradiction, he lost all interest in the traditional problems of philosophy. He 
constructed logical systems that only allow consistent "talk" about objects and 
he believed that he had "proven" that a certain, limited, kind of universal did 
11 D. M. Armstrong, Nominalism and Realism, Cambridge, England: Cambridge University 
Press, 1978, p. 138. 
12 Tadeusz Kotarbinski, Gnosiology, The Scientific Approach to the Theory of Knowledge, 
Trans. Olgierd Wojtasiewicz, Oxford, New York: Pergamon Press, 1966, p. 430. · 
9 
not exist, but he did not engage in the debate over the existence of universals. 
For that reason, it is necessary to provide a background against which we 
might capture Lesniewski's philosophical beliefs and from which a clearer 
sense of Lesniewski's nominalism can be defined. 
The realist/conceptualist/nominalist debate over the existence of 
universals and an example of a realistic notion of universals will provide such a 
background, since nominalism makes no sense outside of that debate and since 
that debate makes no sense apart from what it means for a universal to exist. 
The background I will provide makes no claim to completeness, it is purposely 
constructed to highlight Lesniewski's philosophical beliefs. 
It is, perhaps, best to begin our effort to provide a background for an 
understanding of nominalism from the common origins of realism, 
conceptualism and nominalism . These philosophical doctrines find their roots 
in the beliefs of common sense realism. A common sense realist believes that 
things like houses, trees, and people, things which we sense, i.e. particular 
things or natural objects, actually exist in the world. He believes that we can 
use ordinary language to talk about the things that exist, to talk about our 
knowledge of what exists, and to talk about the correspondence between the 
two. The realist, the conceptualist, and the nominalist, then, attempt to give 
accounts of the same "world." They differ in that the realist emphasizes the 
correspondence between objects which actually exist in the world and our inner 
knowledge of those objects; the conceptualist emphasizes our inner knowledge 
of objects; and the nominalist emphasizes the outer world of objects. 
It has been suggested that the roots of nominalism lie in the Medieval 
controversy over the "existence" of universals. 
Medieval Realists .. . held that universals are real entities 
subsisting independent of mind and sense. Medieval 
Conceptualists .. . maintained that universals are real but mind-
10 
dependent entities whose existence in the understanding may, 
however, be due to similarities among objects. Medieval 
Nominalists .. . advocated that only particular things exist. Thus, 
members of a species were thought to have nothing in common, 
except possibly the name of the species which refers to each 
individual of the species.13 
Since, as we will find, Lesniewski rejects epistemology and he did not 
concern himself with the inner existence of objects, it is safe to eliminate 
further consideration of conceptualism. Even if Lesniewski believed that 
universals exist in mind, we will see that he rejects the realist belief that 
universals somehow exist in the world. For that reason, I will focus my 
considerations below on the realist/nominalist debate over the existence of 
universals. 
It is clear that in order to understand nominalism, we need to know what 
universals are for a realist in order to understand why a nominalist might 
reject them. 
2) Aristotle vs. Lesniewski 
Aristotle's account of natural objects 14 includes a description of 
universals. My discussion of Aristotle's Theory of Universals, therefore , will be 
limited to a discussion of how Aristotle might answer the following two 
questions: 
What is a natural object? 
How do we know a natural object? 
Although Aristotle believed that philosophy begins and ends with an 
account of the common sense world - "In general ... philosophy seeks the cause 
of perceptible things ... 1115 -, he also believed that a philosopher must extend 
13 Rolf A. Eberle, Nominalistic Systems, Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing 
Company, 1970, p. 4. 
14 This section contains an abbreviated interpretation of Aristotle 's treatment of universals 
and particulars. Appendix A contains a more complete treatment. 
15 Aristotle, The Complete Works Of Aristotle, 2 Volumes, Ed. Jonathan Barnes , Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1985, p. 1568 . 
11 
beyond what is merely sensed in order to provide a true account of natural 
objects . 
.. . while ... thinkers were inquiring into the truth of that which is, 
they thought that which is was identical with the sensible world; 
in this, however, there is largely present the nature of the 
indeterminate ... and, therefore, while they speak plausibly, they 
do not say what is true. 16 
Although it is true that Aristotle uses the word "substance" in different 
ways, I believe that for Aristotle a natural object, a particular thing, is a 
combination of two "substances", that is a combination of matter and form, 
neither of which exist separately. He also believed that we "know" these 
"substances" in two distinct ways. Matter causes sensation; form causes 
knowledge. Form, for Aristotle, is "what is truly universal in a particular." 
Matter is that persistent substance which, along with form, combine to form a 
particular thing. 
Although matter and form are what we sense and what we know directly 
and although we can "see" evidence of the existence of these "substances" in 
the sensible world - that there can be both a bronze sphere (form) and a bronze 
circle (form), i.e. two different forms made of identical matter, and that there 
can be a bronze and a wooden sphere, i.e. two identical forms made of different 
matter - matter and form are, in a sense, posited as substances necessary to 
give a more complete account of change. Although I will not treat Aristotle's 
account of motion, Aristotle believed that motion caused matter to "flow" from 
one form to another. 
"The form is a kind of power in matter - a duct as it were." 17 
It is almost as if motion were a general force, moving matter from one form 
into another. 
l6 Ibid., p. 1594. 
17 Ibid., p. 527. 
12 
What can be a bit confusing about Aristotle's account of universals, is, 
that while form is 'truly what is universal in a particular' and form is a 
"substance" we know directly in a different way from matter, the word 
"universal" is most frequently used to refer to the accumulation of experiences 
of the same form in the mind. In any case, when one knows form, 'what is 
universal in a particular,' one actually knows a universal. The more we 
experience the same form , however, the more aware of the universal we 
become. This accumulation is neither a different sort of knowledge nor is it 
knowledge of a different sort of thing than knowledge of 'what is universal in a 
particular.' 
For Aristotle, ifwe reject the existence of universals , we reject not only a 
thing that exists differently than matter , but also the immediate object of our 
knowledge. 
Returning to the questions raised above: 
What is a natural object? 
How do we know a natural object? 
Aristotle finds it necessary to answer both questions simultaneously. 
He seems to feel that any discussion about "what is" necessarily requires a 
discussion of "how we know what is. 11 He developed his theory of universals, in 
part, as an epistemological counterpart to his ontological belief that 
particulars, natural objects, actually exist in the world. If he had not, he would 
have been confronted by two problems: what there is, is not, simply because 
we know it AND what we know must be a different sort of thing than what is, 
otherwise existence, in a sense, would be contingent on our knowledge. In final 
analysis, universals are required in order to say how we know what is, since 
what is seems to be always changing. A particular thing, a natural object, is 
both form and matter . Our knowledge of form, then, provides us our knowledge 
13 
of what is similar in particulars and gives us the means to group natural 
objects according to their similarities. General names, then, actually denote 
universal substance, i.e. form. 
How does Lesniewski's notion of universal fair against Aristotle's? In his 
earlier works Lesniewski believed that his definition of "general object" was 
sufficiently broad to encompass several kinds of universals. 
'General objects', according to the various authors dealing with 
them, possess a single characteristic property and that 
irrespective of particular forms assumed by those objects in the 
different systems in which they exist either as e.g.: 'notions' in 
the sense of ancient and medieval 'realism', or Locke's 'general 
ideas', or Twardowski's 'objects of general representations', or 
Husserl's 'ideal' objects existing 'outside time'. 18 
Even though Lesniewski later eliminates his references to other 
philosophers, he retains the same definition of"general object," i.e. "general 
objects" are objects which "possess a single characteristic property ... that the 
object which is allegedly 'general' with respect to a group of'individual' objects 
can possess only those properties which are common to all corresponding 
'individual' objects."19 
Even though Lesniewski's notion of "general objects" and his "proofs" 
against the existence of universals will be more thoroughly discussed in 
Chapter III, it is important to note here that he did not comment on other 
notions of universals which might have provided justification for his own 
restricted notion of what he defined as universals, i.e. "general objects". 
Neither his definition of"general objects" nor his "proofs" against the existence 
of"general objects", thrust Lesniewski into the realist/nominalist debate over 
the existence of universals. 
18 Stanislaw Lesniewski, "The Critique of the Logical Principle of the Excluded Middle", 
Stanislaw Lesniewski Collected Works, Eds. Stanislaw J. Surma, Jan T. Srzednicki, D.I. 
Barnett, Trans. S. J. Surma and J. Wojcik, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1992, p. 51. 
19 Ibid., p. 51. 
14 
Aristotle's Theory of Universals was meant to provide an 
epistemological and ontological basis for a discussion of change in natural 
objects. 
Lesniewski's logical systems are said to be ontologically neutral. 
So his [Lesniewski's logical - my note] systems are logically pure 
and metaphysically neutral in that they do not logically 
presuppose or imply what is the population of the universe or the 
denotation of expressions ... ~ 
As true as this characterization might be, Lesniewski does mention the 
existence of natural objects in his published works. It is obvious that 
Lesniewski would not deny the existence of quite ordinary things. One must 
realize , however, that Lesniewski occupied himself almost completely with the 
construction of a language, his logical systems, which might provide a 
consistent language for science and a consistent basis for mathematics; he 
avoided metaphysical discussion and rejected the usefulness of epistemology. 
3) Realism vs. Nominalism 
My intent is not to argue for or against the nominalist or realist point of 
view, but, in this section, to provide a critical framework in which to highlight 
the differences between nominalistic and realistic view of the world and, 
therefore, to highlight the fact that certain features ofLesniewski's logical 
, ... ystems are nominalistic. 
D. M.-Armstrong presents a critique of nominalism in his book 
11N ominalism and Realism. 11 He presents the nominalist/realist controversy as 
follows: 
Nominalists deny that there is any genuine or objective identity 
in things which are not identical. Realists, on the other hand, 
hold that the apparent situation is the real situation. There 
genuinely is, or can be, something identical in things which are 
20 Eugene C. Luschei , The Logical Systems Of Lesniewski, Amsterdam: North-Holland 
Publishing Company , 1962, p . 108. 
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not identical. Besides particulars, there are universals. 21 
For Armstrong an account of our knowledge of natural objects 
necessarily includes the existence of universals. The fact that we can 
simultaneously know things as individuals and as identical in certain respects 
requires the existence of something in addition to the particular. Because of 
that, Armstrong notes, even though 11 ••• all Nominalists agree that all things 
that exist are only particulars, 1122 at some point in their account of natural 
objects, in their effort to reduce the 11apparent identity in things which are not 
identical, 11 they inevitably must appeal to properties, that is to universals. 
And, 
All that the Nominalist can hope to do is to give a reductive 
analysis or account of what it is for something to have a property 
or to be of a certain kind or sort: a reductive analysis or account 
of types. 23 
If, then, in the course of an attempted N ominalist analysis it 
should happen that covert appeal is made to the notion of 
property, kind or type, the analysis has failed to achieve its 
purpose. 24 
In his account of different kinds of nominalism (predicate nominalism, concept 
nominalism, class nominal.ism, mereological nominal.ism, resemblance 
nominalism, Ostrich or Cloak-and-dagger Nominalism), he shows that each 
attempt fails to explain away similarities in things because it must, in the end, 
either appeal to properties, that is universals, or, in the case of Ostrich or 
Cloak-and-dagger N ominalism, simply ignore the II apparent identity in things 
which are not identical." 
In his general critique of nominalism, Armstrong concludes: 
Ordinary thought and discourse recognizes identity both of 
particulars and property, sort, or kind. Indeed, without the 
21 D. M. Armstrong, Nominalism and Realism, Cambridge, England: Cambridge University 
Press, 1978, p. 12. 
22 Ibid., p. 12. 
23 Ibid., p. 19 
24 Ibid., p. 19. 
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distinction between sameness of thing and sameness of property 
or kind, thought and discourse would be impossible. 25 
For Armstrong, then, in order to be successful, a nominalist must be able to 
explain the sameness of things without appealing to properties. 
D. F. Pears critiques both realism and nominalism. He believes that 
both nominalism and realism fail for the same reason. 
Their (realism/nominalism- my note) goal is the unattainable 
completely satisfactory explanation of naming.~ 
He criticizes realism in the following way: 
But ultimately there must be some exit from the maze of words, and , 
wherever this exit is made, it will be impossible to give an informative 
reason except by pointing. For the only other way of giving an 
informative reason is to give a new word, and this would prevent the exit 
from the maze of words from being made at this place 7. Still at the place 
where the exit is made it is always possible to give a detailed reason like 
'We are able to call things red because they are red', which is too 
obviously circular even to look informative. Or alternatively it is 
possible to say 'We are able to call things <j> because they are <j>', and this 
is a general reason which is almost as obviously circular and 
uninformative. What philosophers who propose the existence of 
universals do is to propose a general reason which looks informative 
because it shifts to another level, but unfortunately is not. Z7 
He offers a similar criticism ofnominalism: 
The type of nominalism which says that a name is applied to a 
number of things which are similar immediately falls into the 
same circularity.28 
Because this 
... similarity can be specified only by a backward reference to the 
name. 29 
25 Ibid., p. 19. 
26 D. F. Pears, "Universals ", Universals And Particulars: Readings In Ontology, Editor 
Michael Loux, Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1970, p. 48. 
27 Ibid., p. 38. 
28 Ibid., p. 41. 
29 Ibid., p. 42 . 
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Although Pears' article is critical of both nominalism and realism, at one 
point he criticizes nominalism in a way that seems to support the realistic 
assertion that universals serve an important function. 
The type ofnominalism which suggests that things which are 
called by one name have only their name in common represent 
the extreme of artificiality. 21 It suggests that there 
are never any ways of telling even approximately whether a 
word is used in one sense or two senses [i.e. that there is a 
reason one can call two things by the same name - my note]. 30 
In another place, where he is critical of both nominalism and realism, he 
actually seems to support the nominalist1s assertion that only particulars 
exist, only the natural objects of common sense realism, by claiming that 
naming is justified by pointing to a particular thing or a collection of particular 
things. 
If a word is explained ostensively, then however difficult this 
process may be it really is explained ostensively. It is no good 
trying to combine the concreteness of ostensive definition with 
the clarityofverbal definition. Verbal definitions have such an 
easy task just because ostensive definitions have such a difficult 
task. 31 
In the following Chapters, it will become clear that Lesniewski 
constructed his logical systems in such a way as to avoid Pears' particular 
criticism ofnominalistic languages. Lesniewski does not have to resort to 
properties to be able to 11talk 11 about collections. In Lesniewski's logical 
systems, naming is analogous to pointing to a particular thing or a collection of 
things. 
4) Remarks 
In the next Chapter, Chapter III, I will explore Lesniewski 1s nominalism 
and also discuss his notion of universals. Both Armstrong's and Pears' critique 
should provide a loose background against which Lesniewski's own notions can 
3o Ibid., p. 47. 
31 Ibid., p. 48. 
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be measured. If Armstrong is correct, Lesniewski can not be a successful 
nominalist ifhe appeals to properties in his account of natural objects or if 
properties are necessary for the success of his logical systems. Pears' critique 
is pertinent because Lesniewski, I believe, will be able to overcome his 
criticism of nominalist language in a way Pears has not considered. At this 
point, however, we must begin to investigate the origins ofLesniewski's 
rejection of universals. 
19 
Chapter III- Lesniewski's Nominalism 
1) The Origins OfLesniewski's Nominalism 
The first evidence ofLesniewski's nominalism, his belief that universals 
do not exist, can be traced to the time when he first became interested in 
modern symbolic logic (1910) and, more specifically, when (1911) he first 
became familiar with Russell's Paradox ("class of all classes not members of 
(subordinate to) themselves"). Underlying his earlier and his transitional 
works was an intense, long -term, study (1911-1922) of Russell's Paradox and 
similar antinomies. 
While publishing in turn the above works [His earlier works; 
seven papers written during the period (1911-1914) - my note], I 
occupied myself zealously with the 'antinomies'. From the time 
when in the year 1911 I began an acquaintance with them by 
meeting with the 'antinomies' of Russell related to the 'class 
[klasy] of classes not elements of themselves', and problems 
concerning the antinomies were the most demanding subject of 
my deliberations for over eleven years. 32 
2) Russell's Paradox and Lesniewski's "Solution" 
In Principia Mathematica3 3 Whitehead and Russell determined that, if a 
class were considered the same sort of thing as one of its members, a paradox 
would result. The paradox, "Russell's Paradox" results when we consider 
whether or not "K," "a class of classes not subordinated to themselves," is 
subordinated to itself. Lesniewski presents the Paradox quite clearly; I follow 
his presentation below. 
In order to understand the way in which the Russell's Paradox arises, 
one must make two distinctions. First, a distinction must be made between a 
"full class" and an "empty class." A full class, the class of all men, for example, 
32 Stanislaw Lesniewski, "On The Foundations Of Mathematics, Stanislaw Lesniewski 
Collected Works, Eds. Stanislaw J. Surma, Jan T. Srzednicki, D.I. Barnett, Trans. D . I . 
Barnett, Dordrecht, The Netherlands : Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992, p. 199. 
33 Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, Principia Mathematica, Vol. 1, 
Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1950, pp. 24, 37, and 60 - 65. 
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contains some individuals; an empty class, the class of all square circles, for 
example, contains no individuals. Secondly, one must make a distinction 
between classes that are and classes that are not subordinated to themselves. 
A class not subordinated to itself, the 11class ofmen 11 for example, is not a man, 
while a class subordinated to itself, the class of names, for example, is a name 
or, to use Lesniewski's example, "the class of full classes 11 is also a full class 
and, therefore, it is subordinated to itself. 
With these distinctions made, we are then prepared to ask our question: 
Is "K," "a class of classes not subordinated to themselves," subordinated to 
itself or not? 
If we accept that class K is subordinated to itself, then because 
each class subordinated to the class K is not subordinated to 
itself, we reach the conclusion that class K is not subordinated to 
itself. Therefore a contradiction arises, for from this, that class 
K is subordinated to itself, it results that K is not subordinated to 
itself. 
If we wish to avoid this contradiction, we must accept that class 
K is not subordinated to itself. However, if it is not subordinated 
to itself, then it belongs to class K, consequently it is 
subordinated to itself. And so here also there arises a 
contradiction, since from the fact that class K is not subordinated 
to itself, it results that it is subordinated to itself. Whichever way 
we turn we encounter a contradiction. 34 
In short, Russell's Paradox results when a class is simultaneously 
treated as the same sort of thing as its members . 
. . . the appearance of contradiction is produced by the presence of some 
word which has systematic ambiguity of type, such as ... class ... 35 
Whitehead and Russell believed that a class is not one of its members.3 6 
They were not prepared to claim that a class actually exists. 37 Instead, 
34 Stanislaw Lesniewski, "On The Foundations Of Mathematics, Stanislaw Lesniewski 
Collected Works, Eds . Stanislaw J. Surma , Jan T. Srzednicki, D.I . Barnett, Trans . D. I. 
Barnett, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992, p. 201. 
35 Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, Principia Mathematica, Vol. 1, 
Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1950, p . 64. 
36 Ibid., p. 24 . 
37 Ibid., p. 72 . 
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Whitehead and Russell introduce class into their logical system as an 
"incomplete symbol": 
The symbols for classes ... are incomplete symbols: their uses are 
defined, but they themselves are not assumed to mean anything at 
all.38 
... classes, so far as we introduce them, are merely symbolic or 
linguistic conveniences, not genuine objects as their members are if they 
are individuals. 39 
Although Whitehead and Russell did not believe that a class really 
exists, they admit that they can neither prove that it exists nor prove that it 
does not exist. Their own belief that classes do not exist is based on arguments 
from " ... the ancient problem of the One and the Many'. "40 
Briefly, the arguments reduce to the following: If there is such an 
object as a class, it must be in some sense one object. Yet it is only of 
classes that many can be predicated. Hence, ifwe admit classes as 
objects, we must suppose that the same object can be both one and 
many, which seems impossible. 41 
In the quotation below Lesniewski quoted and criticized Whitehead and 
Russell's reason for believing that classes do not exist. Figure 1, below, is 
referenced in his comments. 
C D 
Figure 1. 
Despite my sincerest wish, I am unable to treat seriously the thesis 
which proclaims that, "ifwe admit classes as objects, we must suppose 
that the same object can be both one and many which seems 
impossible", as I feel in it some gross misunderstanding: evenposito 
that the expression 'many' causes no doubts on the theme 'at least how 
many?', I can find no sense in saying about some object that it is 'many' 
even though, by assuming that the meaning of the expression 'many' is 
not uncertain with respect to quantity, that it means e.g., the same as 
'at least two', I fully understand e.g., the utterance that 'many objects' 
38 Ibid., p. 71. 
39 Ibid., p. 72. 
40 Ibid., p. 72. 
41 Ibid., p. 72, fn. *. 
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exist in the world, or even the utterance that segment AB of Fig. 1 has 
'many' parts. Seeing no sense in the thesis quoted, I cannot regard it as 
an even slightly 'cogent' argument for anything at all in the world. 42 
Because Whitehead and Russell can give no reason to reject or accept 
their notion of class, Lesniewski simply dismissed that notion. 
Scenting in the 'classes' of Whitehead and Russell and in the 
'extensions of concepts' ofFrege, the aroma of mythical 
specimens from a rich gallery of 'invented' objects, I am unable 
to rid myself of an inclination to sympathize 'on credit' with the 
authors' doubts as to whether objects which are such 'classes', do 
exist in the world. 43 
Even though Whitehead and Russell did not resolve the issue of the 
existence of classes, they embedded their notion of class in their logical system 
and proposed a Theory of Types to rid that system of "Russell's Paradox". 44 
Lesniewski was dissatisfied with Whitehead and Russell's notion of class 
because it left open the possibility that a class existed as a different sort of 
thing than its members. 
Lesniewski, on the other hand, developed Ontology and Mereology in 
such a way that Russell's Paradox could not appear in his logical systems 
because he "defined" a class as an object which, ifit existed, exists as a 
collection of objects of the same type. 
3) Lesniewski's View Of Classes 
Lesniewski' realized that we can talk about "class" in two ways and, in 
order to eliminate the possibility of "Russell's Paradox" from his logical 
systems, he realized that he needed to include both ways of talking about 
"class" in the construction of his logical systems. In the distributive sense, 
42 Stanislaw Lesniewski, "On The Foundations Of Mathematics", Stanislaw Lesniewski 
Collected Works, Eds. Stanislaw J. Surma, Jan T. Srzednicki, D.I. Barnett , Trans. D. I. 
Barnett, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992, pp. 225 and 
226. 
43 Ibid ., pp. 224 and 225. 
44 Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, Principia Mathematica, Vol. 1, 
Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1950, p. 60. 
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"class" can be used in phrases like "a is a member of class P. 11 In the collective 
sense, 11class 11 can also be used in phrases like "Pis a class of a's. 11 
In Ontology, Lesniewski was able to eliminate the distributive use of 
11class 11 by reducing 11a is a member of class P 11 to 11a is P11 or to "a is one of the 
P's, 11 since the Axiom of Ontology specifies that both a andP are the same sort 
ofthing . 
... expressions of the form 'N is a member of the class cs', for 
instance, may be regarded simply as long-winded ways of saying 
'N is a c' or 'N is one of the cs'.45 
... a Lesniewskian sentence of the form 'a£ b' is true just in case 
the term 'a' is (semantically) singular, and the individual it 
denotes is one of the one or more individuals denoted by 'b '. I 
suggest that the ordinary language expression coming closest to 
expressing this is 'a is one of b ': we think of examples such as 
'Romeo is one of the Montagues', 'John Williams is one of Sky', 
and so on.46 
· Through the Axiom of Ontology Lesniewski was able to specify that both 
11a 11 and 11P11 must be the same kinds of things. Since 11class 11 is removed from 
Ontology, the possibility of contradiction from the use of 11class 11 in Ontology is 
eliminated. 
In the axioms and definitions of Mereology, Lesniewski was able to 
specify that a 11collective 11 class is a collection of things and nothing more. If we 
ask what a class is in Mereology, it is a collection and that is all. In order to 
demonstrate this, we must examine the first two axioms and the first two 
definitions ofMereology. 
AI. [P ,Q]:PEcz(Q).:::).QEN(cz(P)). 47 
45 Peter M. Simons, "On Understanding Lesniewski", History And Philosophy Of Logic. 
Volume 3 , 1982, p. 188. 
46 Ibid., p . 184. 
47 Srzednicki, Jan T.J. and Stachniak, Zbigniew, Ed., Lesniewski's Lecture Notes in Logic, 
Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers , 1988 , p. 60. 
All. [P ,Q,R]:Ptcz( Q).Qtcz(R).::J.Ptcz(R). 48 
D.I. [P,Q]:.Ptel(Q).=:P=Q.v.Ptcz(Q)49 
D.11. [P ,a]::PtIG.(a).=:.Prnbj:.[Q]:Qta.::J.Qtel(P):. 
[ Q]:Qtel(P).::J .[3R, S] .Rtel( Q).Sta. Rtel(S). 50 
Before a detailed look at Lesniewski's "collective" class, "Kl(a)" in D. II 
above, I would like to make three observations. First, the most basic element 
of Mereology is something which is designated a part, i.e. "cz", of something 
else. So, whoever would use Mereology to talk about the world, must first 
specify what is to be taken as a part. From this it must be recognized that, if 
anything can be "built" in Mereology", it must be built of parts. Second, a class 
and its members are defined as the same sort of thing and, ultimately, they 
must be specified in terms of things, i.e. part(s), which are in the world. Thirdly, 
"Kl" is not an object in D.II .. "Kl" specifies how objects "a" are to be collected. 
Let us now look closely at D. II and determine exactly what "P is a class 
of a's", i.e. 11PtKl(a) 11, means. "PtKl(a)" is "defined" by the three conjuncts 
which follow the equivalence sign. "Prnbj, 11 the first conjunct, specifies that 11P 11 
in "PtKl(a)" must be an object. The second conjunct, "[Q]:Qta.::J.Qtel(P),11 
determines the relationship between the object "P" and the object(s) "a" in 
"PtKl(a)" and can be translated into the English sentence: "If any thing is an 
'a,' then that thing is 'P' or is one of the parts of 'P' .11 The third, the last 
conjunct, [Q]:Qrnl(P).::J.[3R,S].Rtel(Q).Sta.Rtel(S), specifies that, "if any Q is 
one of the elements of P" or, another way of saying the same thing, "if any Q is 
P or is a part of P", "then" three conditions must be met. First, "there is some 
thing R which is Q or a part ofQ. 11 Second , "there is some thing S which is one 
of the a 's." And, lastly, "the thing which is Q or part of Q, i.e. R, is the same 
48 Ibid. , p. 60. 
49 Ibid. , p. 60. 
5o Ibid., p. 60. 
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thing as the thing S (which is one of the a's) or is a part of that thing S (which is 
one of the a's)." In short, "PiJG(a)" could be read "Pis the collection of a's" or 
' 
as Lesniewski suggests, "PEIG(a)" could also be read "Pis the' ... heap of objects 
a consisting of every a .'51." 
Lesniewski believed in a quite concrete notion of class and, therefore, 
could reject a Theory of Types. 
Expressions of the type 'class of objects a' are, on the basis of 
my mereology, names denoting definite and quite ordinary 
objects. These expressions naturally have nothing in common 
either with any mythology of 'classes', considered as objects of 
some 'higher type' or 'higher order', or with a use of the word 
'class' in which the latter is not the name of any object(s) , but 
rather a surrogate {aeon de parler of some entirely different 
syntactical type , as for example the system of Whitehead and 
Russell. The totality of theorems of my system of the 
foundations of mathematics, which in practice can be handled as 
theoretical correlates of this or that thesis of these authors' 
'theory of classes', forms a proper part ofmy ontology.s2 
In addition to his "definition" of class in Mereology, Lesniewski offered his 
objections to certain kinds of classes which were excluded from that logical 
system. Lesniewski did not accept the existence of empty classes which , if 
accepted , would necessarily have to exist apart from their members because 
an empty class has no members. 
Being of the opinion that, if an object is the class of some a (e.g., 
people, points, square circles), then it actually consists of a, I 
always rejected, in accordance with thesis (1) on page 186, the 
existence of theoretical monstrosities like the class of square 
circles , understanding only too well that nothing can consist of 
something which does not even exist. There has never been a 
time in my life in which I would not have been in complete 
agreement with the lapidary remark of Frege apropos the 
5l Stanislaw Lesniewski, "On The Foundations Of Mathematics ", Stanislaw Lesniewski 
Collected Works, Eds. Stanislaw J . Surma, Jan T. Srzednicki , D.I. Barnett , Trans. D. I. 
Barnett, Dordrecht , The Netherlands : Kluwer Academic Publishers , 1992, p . 225. 
52 Stanislaw Lesniewski , "Introductory Remarks to the Continuation of My Article: 
'Grundzuge eines neuen Systems der Grundlagen der Mathematik 111, Stanislaw Lesniewski 
Collected Works, Eds . Stanislaw J . Surma, Jan T. Srzednicki, D.I. Barnett , Trans. W. 
Teichmann and S. McCall , Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
1992 , pp. 709 - 710. 
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theory of classes of Ernest Schroeder: "If' ... 11 a class consists of 
objects, is an aggregate, a collective unity of them, then it must 
vanish when the objects vanish. Ifwe burn all the trees in a 
forest, we thereby burn the forest. Thus there can be no empty 
class." 53 
Lesniewski did not believe that a class of just one object existed. A 
natural object, for example, may be considered a single thing, and, therefore , "is 
a class, whose only element is just that object, 11 but Lesniewski insisted that 
even that object might contain elements (refer to Figure 1. repeated below). 
D 
... I firmly reject ... the view according to which (E*) every object 
is a class, whose only element is just that object, because , 
considering e.g., segment AB of Fig. I and taking into account the 
circumstance that, from the point of view of my conception of 
classes (see thesis (17, Chapter II), segment AC is an element of 
segment AB which is in accordance with thesis (13) the class of 
the segments which are segment AC or segment CB, I am, of 
course, entitled to assert that although one and only one object 
is segment AB ofFig. 1, and although such being the case, in 
accordance with thesis (3) segment AB is also the class of 
segments AB, that segment is by no means the class whose only 
element is just that segment AB. 54 
At the same time that Lesniewski eliminated the ambiguous notion of 
class from his logical systems, I believe that he saw a similarity between the 
ambiguous notion of class and the notion of a "general" object, objects which 
Lesniewski believed were universa ls and which he thought were ambiguous as 
well. Lesniewski , therefore, believed that he could eliminate the ambiguous 
notion of universals just as he had eliminated the ambiguous notion of class. If 
53 Stanislaw Lesniewski, "On The Foundations Of Mathematics", Stanislaw Lesniewski 
Collected Works , Eds. Stanislaw J . Surma , Jan T. Srzednicki , D.I. Barnett, Trans. D. I. 
Barnett , Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992, pp. 214 and 
215. 
54 Stanislaw Lesniewski , "On The Foundations Of Mathematics ", Stanislaw Lesniewski 
Collected Works, Eds. Stanislaw J. Swma , Jan T . Srzednicki , D.I. Barnett , Trans. D. I. 
Barnett, Dordrecht , The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers , 1992 , p. 216. 
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his notion of class as a collection of objects and nothing more, eliminated 
"Russell's Paradox" and Whitehead and Russell's Theory of types, he believed 
that "general" objects, universals, could be analogously eliminated by showing 
that universals could not exist apart from the individuals whose common 
property they were supposed to possess and, therefore, that they did not exist. 
4) Lesniewski's Two "Proofs" That "General" Objects Do Not Exist. 
Lesniewski offered two "proofs" against the existence of "general" 
objects. His first "proof' 55 appeared in 1913 in an article titled "The Critique of 
the Logical Principle of Excluded Middle"56 and is the only part of any earlier 
work not later repudiate. Tadeusz Kotarbinski includes a version of 
Lesniewski's first "proof," along with similar proofs of his own and others, in his 
book titled "Gnosiology" which was published in 1929.57 
Lesniewski's second "proof' 58 appeared during his "mature" period in 
1927 in the footnote 59 of an article titled "On Russell's 'Antinomy' Concerning 
'The Class of Classes Which Are Not Elements ofThemselves'." 60 This article 
was the second of a series of papers collectively titled "On the Foundations of 
Mathematics." These papers were published between 1927 and 1931. Eugene 
Luschei includes a version ofLesniewski's second proof in his book "The Logical 
55 The wording of Lesniewski's First Proof is included as Appendix B. 
56 Stanislaw Lesniewski, "The Critique of the Logical Principle of Excluded Middle", 
Stanislaw Lesniewski Collected Works, Eds. Stanislaw J. Surma, Jan T. Srzednicki, D.I. 
Barnett, Trans. S. J. Surma and J. Wojcik, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1992, pp. 51 through 53. 
5? Tadeusz Kotarbinski, Gnosiology, The Scientific Approach to the Theory of Knowledge, 
Trans. Olgierd Wojtasiewicz, Ed. G. Bidwell and C. Pinder, Oxford and New York: 
Pergamon Press, 1966, p. 36, (please see footnote 5). 
58 The wording of Lesniewski's Second Proof is included as Appendix C. 
59 Stanislaw Lesniewski, "On The Foundations Of Mathematics", Stanislaw Lesniewski 
Collected Works, Eds. Stanislaw J. Surma, Jan T. Srzednicki , D.I. Barnett, Trans. D. I. 
Barnett, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992, p. 198. The 
proof, interestingly enough, appears where Lesniewski actually repudiates all that he wrote 
during his 'initial period'. 
60 Ibid.,pp. 198 and 199, fn. 6. 
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Systems OfLesniewski 11 published in 1962.61 Kotarbinski also gives a 
summary of "the essential point" of both "proofs "62 and hints that Lesniewski 
believed that both "proofs" were essentially the same. 63 
There are similarities between both "proofs." In both "proofs" "general" 
objects are defined in the same way: they "possess a single characteristic 
property ... that the object which is allegedly 'general' with respect to a group of 
'individual' objects can possess only those properties which are common to all 
corresponding 'individual' objects."64 Both "proofs" have the same form; they 
are both reductio ad absurdum "proofs." 
There are also differences between the first and the second "proof." In 
the second "proof': 
1. Lesniewski withdrew his comparison between his notion of a 
"general" object and different authors, e.g. Locke's, Twardowski's and Husserl's, 
notion of "universal" objects, that is, he eliminated his desire to 11ascribe this or 
that opinion on the question of 'general object' to the authors mentioned" in his 
first 11proof. 11 
I regard my treatment as the result of careful formulation of 
theoretical tendencies involved, more or less explicitly, in the 
argumentation of opponents of the different kinds of 'universals' 
in various phases of their 'disputes' about them. If one takes the 
position that this assertion is a banal one, I would cite in defense 
the circumstance that exponents of 'philosophy' defend, 
61 Eugene C. Luschei, The Logical Systems Of Lesniewski, North-Holland Publishing 
Company, 1962, footnote 21, pp. 308 through 310. 
62 Tadeusz Kotarbinski, Gnosiology, The Scientific Approach to the Theory of Knowledge, 
Trans. Olgierd Wojtasiewicz, Ed. G. Bidwell and C. Pinder, Oxford and New York: 
Pergamon Press, 1966, p. 430. "An essential point in this borrowed proof was the 
assumption that each object of a given set of objects has a specific property of its own, and 
hence a universal can by definition neither have that property nor its negation, which runs 
contrary to the law of excluded middle, and indirectly contrary to the law of contradiction. " 
63 Ibid., p. 48, fn . 5 . 
64 Stanislaw. Lesniewski , "The Critique of the Logical Principle of Excluded Middle ", Trans. 
S. J. Surma and J . Wojcik, Stanislaw Lesniewski Collected Works, Eds. Stanislaw J. 
Surma, Jan T. Srzednicki, D.I. Barnett, Kluwer Academic Publishers , 1991, p. 51. 
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regrettably often, positions at variance with banal assertions. 615 
2. In referring back to his first "proof," Lesniewski states that he no 
longer believes in "features" (properties ) or "relations." 
At the time I wrote that passage I believed that there are in 
existence in this world so called features and so called relations, 
as two special kinds of objects, and I felt no scruples about using 
the expressions 'feature' and 'relations'. It is a long time since I 
believed in the existence of objects which are features, or in the 
existence of objects which are relations and now nothing induces 
me to believe in the existence of such objects (see: Tadeusz 
Kotarbinski, [1921], pp. 7-11) ... 66 
3. Lesniewski did not provide examples of a "general" object in his 
second "proof." 
Even in his first "proof," Lesniewski did not ente r directly into the 
nominalist/realist debate over the existence of universals; he , evidently , 
considered his "proof' sufficient evidence that things such as universals did not 
exist. 
'General objects' , according to the various authors dealing with 
them , possess a single characteristic property and that 
irrespective of particular forms assumed by those objects in the 
different systems in which they exist either as e.g.: 'notions' in 
the sense of ancient and medieval 'realism', or Locke's 'general 
ideas', or Twardowski's 'objects of general representations', or 
Husserl's 'ideal' objects existing 'outside time'. 67 
Lesniewski believed that "general" objects encompassed what several 
philosophers believed were universals. Lesniewski seems to believe that the 
universals of realism are 'notions.' Is he confusing conceptualism with realism? 
None the less he rejects all such things! 
65 Stanislaw Lesniewski , "On The Foundations Of Mathematics ", Stanislaw Lesniewski 
Collected Works , Eds. Stanislaw J. Surma , Jan T. Srzednicki, D.I. Barnett , Trans . D. I. 
Barnett , Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992, p. 199. 
66 Ibid., p. 198. 
67 Stanislaw Lesniewski, "The Critique of the Logical Principle of Excluded Middle ", 
Stanislaw Lesniewski Collected Works, Eds. Stanislaw J. Surma , Jan T. Srzednicki, D.I. 
Barnett, Trans. S. J. Surma and J . Wojcik, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers , 1992 , p . 51. 
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The fact that Lesniewski did not repudiate his first "proof' and actually 
provides a second, mature, "proof' indicates that the nominalistic motivation 
for the creation of his logical systems had not decreased, even though he 
withdrew criticism of various specific notions of "general" objects (universals). 
If Kotarbinski is correct, Lesniewski considered his second "proof' to be 
essentially the same as his first and, therefore, an analysis of the first "proof' 
is sufficient for the purposes of this paper. 
In both "proofs" Lesniewski argued that "general" objects (which 
"possess a single characteristic property ... that the ohject which is allegedly 
'general' with respect to a group of 'individual' objects can possess only those 
properties which are common to all corresponding 'individual' objects."68) does 
not exist. His first "proof' seems to work , ifwe believe that an object's 
existence is contingent on having properties, i.e. that a thing must have a 
property to be an object. By definition a "general" object can have only a 
certain property. To paraphrase Kotarbinski, if there is no property for a 
"general" object to possess, then a "general" object can not exist. And that is 
the reasoning behind Lesniewski's "proof' which I outline below: 
Lesniewski assumed that a "general" object, Pk, exists as defined above. 
1) Pk exists 
a) 1. Every individual object, P'k, has a single property, e.g. 
Ck, that makes it unique. 
2. Ck is not common. 
3. Pk, therefore, does not possess Ck. 
b) 1. The individual object, P'k, possessing Ck, can not 
possess not Ck. (Reason: P'k can possess Ck or not Ck, but not both) 
68 Ibid., p. 51. 
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2. "Not Ck" is not common. ("Not Ck" is not possessed at 
least by P'k) 
3. Pk, therefore, does not possess not Ck. 
4. Pk, therefore, possesses Ck. 
2) Pk does not exist. (The assumption that a "general" object exists 
leads to a contradiction, i.e. Pk possesses and does not possess Ck. Therefore , 
by reductio ad absurdum we are entitled to negate our assumption.) 
Lesniewski's "proof' seems to work if we believe two things. First, we 
must believe that a "general" oQject possesses properties in the same way as 
individual objects, that is, an object's existence must be contingent on the fact 
that it possesses properties. Second, we must believe that there is a single 
property that "makes" each individual individual. Also, I believe that Guido 
Kung is correct in his observation that Lesniewski's "proof' fails because he, 
Lesniewski, assumes that a 'general' object and an 'individual' object are the 
same type of thing, that 'general' objects are to be" ... regarded to be exactly like 
concrete objects."69 The problem with Lesniewski's "proof' is that, if the 
existence of an object is contingent on possessing a unique property, then a 
"general" object, by definition, could never exist because its "existence" is 
contingent on possessing a common property. Lesniewski's "proof' plays on 
the fact that "existence" and "possessing properties" are used equivocally and, 
therefore, it fails. Unlike the success Lesniewski experienced in eliminating the 
ambiguous notion of class from his logical systems, his "proof' that "general 
objects," universals, do not exist fails because it uses "existence" and 
"possessing properties" ambiguously. 
69 Guido Kung, Ontology And The Logistic Analysis Of Language, Dordrecht- Holland: D. 
Reidel Publishing Company, 1967, p . 104. 
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Additionally, Lesniewski 1s proof is not a fair representation of the kind of 
thing a realist would call a universal. In the most general sense, if Pk were 
taken to be a 11general 11 object in respect to 11all individuals being individual, 11 
that is, Ckis the property of being an 11individual, 11 then no realist would claim 
that Pk is an 11individual. 11 Just the reverse; the fact that Pk is not an 
11individual 11 object, could provide proof for a realist that Pk is a different sort of 
thing, namely a 11general 11 object or a universal. 
In 11Is All Truth Only True Eternally Or Is It Also True Without A 
Beginning 11 Lesniewski writes about oQjects, properties, and the relation of 
inherence. 70 In the case of an 11individual 11 object, Lesniewski believes that: 
objects possess properties; properties inhere in objects; and, so, therefore, 
properties relate to objects differently than objects relate to properties. Why 
does Lesniewski deny that there might be a difference between the way in 
which properties inhere in 11individual 11 objects and the way properties inhere in 
11general 11 objects? It seems that Lesniewski simply insists that only 
11individual 11 objects possess properties and properties, properly speaking, can 
onlyinherein 11individual 11 objects. 
Lesniewski 1s second 11proof,11 I believe, merely shows that things defined 
similarly to 11general 11 objects cannot exist in his systems. And, from 
Lesniewski's second "proof,11 it is clear that he no longer believed that he was 
providing a 11proof 1 against any specific notion of a universal. Lesniewski's 
second 11proof' demonstrates his continued belief that nominalistic logical 
systems could best provide a sound basis for mathematics, but his comments 
are evidence that he had abandoned discussion of traditional problems of 
70 Stanislaw Lesniewski, "Is All Truth Only True Eternally or Is It Also True Without 
Beginning ", Stanislaw Lesniewski Collected Works. Eds. Stanislaw J. Surma, Jan T. 
Srzednicki , D.I. Barnett , Trans. S. J. Surma and J . Wojcik, Dordrecht , The Netherlands: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers , 1992 , p. 89 . 
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philosophy to include any part in the realist/nominalist debate over the 
existence of universals. 
5) Lesniewski's Shift In Philosophical Focus 
During his 11mature 11 period (1916 - 1939), Lesniewski repudiated his 
earlier, more philosophical works - except, of course, his first "proof' 'against 
the existence of universals-; he abandoned work on the traditional problems of 
philosophy; and he focused his efforts on the development of his logical 
systems. This 11shift 11 in focus can be seen as early as 1916 when Lesniewski 
published the "Foundations of the General TheoryofSets, 1171 a paper which 
forms 11a bridge between Lesniewski 1s early and later writings. 1172 In that paper 
Lesniewski formally announced the new direction of his thinking. 
I wish to add a few words as a preventative measure against 
possible critical objections from the 1philosophical 1 camp: that is -
in my system the expressions are treated as a hypothetical-
deductive system, from which it follows that, properly speaking, I 
assert only that those propositions which I call 1theorems1 result 
from the propositions which I call 'axioms1. The psychic 1sources 1 
of my axioms are my intuitions, which simply means, that I 
believe in the truth of my axioms, but I am unable to say why I 
believe, since I am not acquainted with the theory of causality. 
My axioms do not have a logical 'source', which simply means 
that these axioms do not have proofs within my system, just as 
in general no axioms, in the nature of things, have proofs in that 
system for which they are axioms. I am quite unable to answer 
the question, what is the 'objective value 1 ofmy axioms, nor any 
other similar questions, which concern the exponents of the so-
called theory of knowledge - because I admit sadly and to my 
clear disadvantage, that despite my most sincere wishes, I am 
still unable to understand even one of the problems which occur in the 
just mentioned respectable 1science 1. 73 
71 Stanislaw Lesniewski, "Foundations of the General Theory of Sets", Stanislaw 
Lesniewski Collected Works, (Vol 1.), Ed. Stanislaw J. Surma, Jan T. Srzednicki, and D. I. 
Barnett, Trans. D. I. Barnett, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academinc Publishers, 
1992 , pp. 131 and 132. 
72 Stanislaw Lesniewski, Stanislaw Lesniewski Collected Works, (Vol 1.), Ed. Stanislaw J. 
Surma, Jan T. Srzednicki, and D. I. Barnett, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer 
Academinc Publishers, 1992, p. ix. 
73 Stanislaw Lesniewski, "Foundations of the General Theory of Sets ", Stanislaw 
Lesniewski Collected Works, (Vol 1.), Ed . Stanislaw J. Surma , Jan T. Srzednicki, and D. I. 
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By abandoning work on the traditional problems of philosophy, 
Lesniewski never constructed a complete philosophical system. He distanced 
himself from the "philosophical camp" - and focused almost completely on the 
development of his logical systems. Sobocinski, a student of Lesniewski, 
recalls that Lesniewski even avoided "philosophical 'asides 111 in published works. 
There is an interesting contrast on this score between the two 
great figures on the Warsaw School of Logic, Lukasiewicz and 
Lesniewski. The latter was also a philosopher by training; he 
too moved away from philosophy and avoided even philosophical 
"asides" in his published work. 74 
Lesniewski's philosophical tendencies, his formalism, his intuitionism, 
his nominalism, his pragmatism, his common-sense, his penchant for 
precision, all provided a loose background against which Lesniewski built his 
logical systems. From Lesniewski's statement above, it appears that he not 
only abandoned the traditional problems of philosophy, but he also found the 
disciplines of philosophy, i.e. ontology and epistemology, irrelevant as well . 
There is no evidence that his attitude toward philosophy or towards logic 
changed after 1916. Lesniewski did, however, continue to believe that 
"general" objects, universals, do not exist. 
6) Remarks 
After Lesniewski's "shift" in thinking, he abandoned work on the 
traditional problems of philosophy. Yet, I believe, he maintained his belief that 
objects exist in the world and universals do not. His belief in this regard can 
hardly be called a philosophical doctrine . In Lesniewski's mature works there 
is no discussion of traditional philosophical issues; his nominalistic inclinations 
can only be inferred from certain metalogical statements about the 
Barnett, Trans. D. I. Barnett, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academinc Publishers, 
1992, pp. 130 and 131. . 
74 Jan Wolenski, Logic And Philosophy In The Lvov-Warsaw School, Dordrecht, The 
Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers , 1989, p. 85. 
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construction of his logical systems, from the fact that features of his logical 
systems can be interpreted nominalistically, and from the few comments 
others have made about his philosophical beliefs. 
36 
Chapter N - Nominalistic Features OfLesniewski 1s Logical Systems. 
Many authors 75 have noted that Lesniewsk:i1s nominalism is evident in 
the features of his logical systems. By considering together the various 
aspects ofLesniewski's logical system, i.e. terminological explanations, 
directives, the axioms and definitions of Protothetic, Ontology and Mereology , 
and the actual theses of Protothetic, Ontology and Mereology which Lesniewski 
developed, Lesniewski 1s nominalistic tendencies are strongly evident. In these 
features we can see how Lesniewski 1s commitment to things is expressed in his 
logical systems. 
Logical systems can be said to be nominalistic in two ways. 1. They 
can be nominalistic in the way they are constructed. 2. They can be 
nominalistic in the way they are used. 
Lesniewski constructed his logical systems as if they were objects . 
There are three aspects of the construction ofLesniewski 1s logical systems 
which are relevant. I will examine Lesniewsk:i 1s notion of Equiformity, his 
Terminological Explanations, and his Directives in the first section of this 
chapter. 
Logical systems are nominalistic in the way they are used, if their 
variables can be replaced by the expressions of some actual language , actual 
things , without the requirement that those expression denote and if, as will be 
discussed below in the examination of Lesniewski 1s quantifiers, the author 
chooses to interpret his quantifiers substitutionally. I believe that 
Lesniewski 1s notion of quantification meets those requirements. 
1) Are Lesniewski 1s Logical Systems Nominalistic In Construction? 
75 Examples of authors who discuss the nominalistic features of Lesniewski 's logical 
systems are: Rolf Eberle in "Nominalistic Systems ", John T. Kearns in "The Contribution of 
Lesniewski ", Guido Kung in "Ontology And The Logistic Analysis Of Language ", Eugene C. 
Luschei in "The Logical Systems Of Lesniewski " and Peter M. Simons in "On Understanding 
Lesniewski". Complete citations are given in the Bibliography. 
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A) Equiformity and Terminological Explanations 
Before Lesniewski introduced his directives, i.e. the rules ofinference, for 
any of his logical systems , he introduced the ax:iom(s) of that system and, 
through the terminological explanations , built up sufficient metalanguage to be 
able to precisely define exactly how theses and definitions were to be 
introduced, that is, just how his logical systems were to be constructed. 
Lesniewski did not consider either the terminological explanations or the 
directives parts of his logical systems . 
. . . directives [and, therefore, Terminological Explanations - my 
note] do not themselves belong to the system of Protothetic 
[Ontology, Mereology- mynote ] which they affect ... 76 
They are parts ofhis overall logical enterprise , how~ver, and , as such , add 
considerably to the nominalistic tone of his logical systems. 
Consideration of the axiom of Protothetic and several of the 
terminological explanations which apply to that axiom will be sufficient to 
provide an understanding of the way in which terminological explanations are 
nominalistic. Lesniewski chose Lukasiewicz's Axiom (L) not only as a basis for 
protothetic but also as the object used in the development of his terminological 
explanations for Protothetic. That Axiom is: 
CC CaC() aCCCNyC6N tC CyC6tC Ct6Crt11C01177 
Two examples of terminological explanations will be sufficient to show 
that terminological explanations are independent statements about Axiom (L) 
and the way Axiom (L) is to be regarded. It should be noted that these 
76 Stanislaw Lesniewski, "Fundamentals Of A New System Of The Foundations Of 
Mathematics ", Stanislaw Lesniewski Collected Works , Eds. Stanisla w J . Surma , Jan T. 
Srzednicki, D.I. Barnett, Trans. M. P. O'Neil , Dordrecht , The Netherlands: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers , 1992 , p. 468. 
77 Stanislaw Lesniewski, "On Definitions In The So-Called Theory Of Deduction ", 
Stanislaw Lesniewski Collected Works , Eds . Stanislaw J . Surma, Jan T. Srzednicki, D.I. 
Barnett , Trans . E. C. Luschei, Dordrecht , The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers , 
1992 , p. 631. 
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terminological explanations preserve the notion of collection which Lesniewski 
developed in Mereology. My example of a terminological explanation will be 
taken from Lesniewski's development of Protothetic. 
Terminowgical explanation I. I say of object A that it is (the) 
complex of (the) a8 if and only if the following conditions are 
fulfilled: 
(1) A is an expression; 
(2) if any object is a word that belongs to A, then it belongs to a 
certain a; 
(3) if any object B is a, any object C is a, and some word that 
belongs to B belongs to C, then B is the same object as C; 
( 4) if any object is a, then it is an expression that belongs to 
A.978 
In the first terminological explanation, Lesniewski is developing a way to 
talk about Axiom (L) in terms of a complex of (the) a, i.e. as a collection of 
words. 
In the second terminological explanations, Lesniewski points to a word in 
Axiom (L) in his explanation of what it is for one object to be the negate of 
another. 
Terminological explanation II. I say of object A that it is (the) 
negate ofB if and only if the following conditions are fulfilled: 
(1) A is an expression; 
(2) B is the complex of objects that are either A or the first of 
the words that belong to B; 
(3) Bis not a word; 
( 4) the first of the words that belong to B is an expression 
equiform to the 11th word of Axiom (L).79 
In this way, terminological explanation after terminological explanation, 
Lesniewski develops and entire vocabulary surrounding Axiom (L) in advance 
of introducing his directives. 
Before proceeding to formulate the directives of this system 
[protothetic - my note] of the theory of deduction based on Axiom 
(L), I give the following series of terminological explanations of 
78 Ibid. , p . 631. 
79 Ibid., p . 633. 
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the technical expressions peculiar to these directives. 80 
Terminological Explanation II contains the word "equiform." Lesniewski 
refers to "an expression equiform to the 11th word of Axiom (L)." Lesniewski 
talks about equiformity in the following ways: 
Every expression is equiform to itself. 81 
Two expressions equiform to each other written in two different 
places are never the same expression. (Not taking these facts 
into consideration could lead the reader to a completely wrong 
interpretation of my terminological explanations ... 82 
When Lesniewski talks about equiformity, he is really talking about 
"seeing" similarities. It is true that Lesniewski wishes to emphasize the fact 
that each expression is an individual , even though it is the same shape as 
another expression. And, in order to do that, he has to appeal to their similar 
shape, a property. This appeal to similarity of shape, however, is not a fatal 
flaw in the construction ofLesniewski 's logical systems. Terminological 
explanations refer to actual objects which exist, i.e. expressions, and, in order to 
understanding thoes similarities, one does not need to appeal to a similarity of 
shape. 
B. Directives 
Having provided a way to talk about Axiom (L), Lesniewski, then, 
introduced the directives for substitution , detachment and definition and for the 
use of quantifiers. Lesniewski believes that his directives save his logical 
systems (Protothetic , Ontology and Mereology) from the possibility of 
contradiction: 
The directives represented above of the system Protothetic, 
together with the directives of Ontology and Mereology which I 
80 Ibid., p. 631. 
81 Stanislaw Lesniewski, "Fundamentals Of A New System Of The Foundations Of 
Mathematics" , Stanislaw Lesniewski Collected Works, Eds. Stanislaw J. Surma, Jan T. 
Srzednicki , D.I. Barnett, Trans. M. P. O'Neil, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers , 1992, p. 4 70. 
82 Ibid. p. 471. 
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shall deal with in further sections of this article, I consider, in all 
due modesty, to be but one of the numerous attempts to 
formalize mathematics which have been undertaken on a larger 
scale by various investigators since the time ofFrege , and which 
are represented today under the 'metamathematical' banner (as 
it is best known) of David Hilbert. But even among those works 
whose purpose is to construct a foundation for mathematics I do 
not know of a single one which actually stipulates, in a way that 
causes no doubts about its interpretation, a combination of 
directives sufficient for the derivation of all the theses effectively 
admitted into its system, and which at the same time would not 
lead to a contradiction in one way or another not foreseen by its 
author. 83 
Once specified, the directives allow the rigorous construction of each of 
Lesniewski's logical systems. Lesniewski viewed each "growing" logical system 
as a definite thing, albeit a growing thing. 
As theses of this system in addition to Axiom (L) I count only 
those 'definitions' and 'theorems' effectively added to the system, 
not various other expressions that might be added according to 
its directives. So the extent of the expression 'thesis of this 
system' is by no means univocally determined in advance, but 
rather is conceived as 'growing' by stages. Axiom (L) is the only 
expression already a thesis of this system . 84 
Lesniewski would never, it appears, talk about possible theses of his 
logical systems. The exactness of his terminological explanations and 
directives assured him that he was able to define precisely the growth of his 
systems . In understanding the development ofLesniewski's logical systems as 
objects, I cannot imagine a system oflogic more precise or more nominalistic in 
construction. They are constructed by appealing only to objects. 
2) Are Lesniewski's Logical Systems (Quantifiers) Used 
Nominalistically? 
83 Ibid., p. 488, fu. 86. 
84 Stanislaw Lesniewski, "On Definitions in the So-Called Theory of Deduction", Stanislaw 
Lesniewski Collected Works, (Vol. II.), Eds. Stanislaw J. Surma, Jan T. Srzednicki , D.I. 
Barnett, Trans. E. C. Luschei, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers 
1992, p. 635, fu. 15. ' 
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I will show that Lesniewski intended that actual expressions of any 
language of the appropriate semantic category could be substituted for the 
variables of his logical systems and, because of that , his notion of 
quantification is substitutional and , therefore, nominalistic. 
W. V. Quine believed that Lesniewski's quantifiers are to be interpreted 
substitutionally and, therefore, are evidence of his nominal.ism. 
Ruth Marcus construes quantification substitutionally, and so, 
less explicitly , did Lesniewski: she for reasons having to do with 
modal logic, he for reasons of nominalism. 85 
We can explain universal quantification as true when true 
under all substitutions; and correspondingly for existential. 
Such is the course that has been favored by Lesniewski and by 
Ruth Marcus . 86 
Quin e's view of Lesniewskian quantification is based on conversations 
he had with Lesniewski himself. 
I cannot locate an adequate statement of Stanislaw Lesniewski's 
philosophy of quantification in his writings; I have it from his 
conversations. E. C. Luschei, in The Logical Systems of 
Lesniewski (Amsterdam: North-Holland , 1962), pp. 108f, 
confirms my attribution but still cites no passage.87 
Lesniewski's logical systems are ontologically neutral; his "quantifiers 
assert only the the existence of expressions." 
Once constants of a specific semantical category are introduced into 
the system, then quantified variables of this semantical category may 
also be used, since Lesniewski's quantifiers assert only the existence of 
expressions. 88 
It may, therefore, seem contradictory to say that Lesniewski's notion of 
quantification provides evidence of his nominalism and, at the same time, to 
85 W. V. Quine , The Roots Of Reference. La Salle , Illinois: Open Court , 1973, p . 99. 
86 Willard Van Orman Quine , Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1969 , p. 63 . 
87 Ibid ., p. 63 , footnote 15. 
88 Kung, Guido, Ontology And The Logistic Analysis Of Language, Dordrecht - Holland: D. 
Reidel Publishing Company , 1967,pp. 123 and 124. 
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say that Lesniewski's logical systems are ontologically neutral. There is , 
however , no contradiction. 
According to Quine, a nominalist, such as Lesniewski, chose 
substitutional quantification to avoid reference to 11 ••• indenumerable and 
indefinite universes ... [ which - my word] ... are what, in the end, give point to 
objectual quantification and ontology. 1189 The fact that Lesniewski's logical 
systems are ontologically neutral , that his quantifiers assert only the existence 
of expressions, then, does not contradict the Quine's assertion that Lesniewski 
chose substitutional quantification because of his nominalism. 
Luschei agrees with Quine's interpretation ofLesniewski's quantifiers. 
Quantification in languageL is an ontologically innocent, strictly 
logical device for making generalizations, whose variables stand 
for (i.e., in place of) arbitrary substituents, or substitutable 
expressions of the same semantic category. 90 
Quine describes two common II attitudes" toward quantifiers: 
1) substitutionally conceived, the "variable is strictly a 
place holder for the constants that can be substituted for it. Such 
variables do not purport to refer to objects as values. The 
constants that may be substituted for them need not be names 
at all; they may belong to any grammatical category . 1191 
2) objectually (or referentially) conceived, "the variable refers to 
objects of some sort as its values; and these need not even be 
objects each of which is separately specifiable by name or 
description. 1192 
He also notes: 
There are not really different interpretations of the quantifiers. 
There are instead different views of variables - how one 
understands a quantifier depends on the way he regards the 
quantified variable. 93 
89 W. V. Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays , New York and London: Columbia 
University Press, 1969, p. 107. 
9o Eugene C. Luschei , The Logical Systems Of Lesniewski , Amsterdam: North-Holland 
Publishing Compan y, 1962 , p. 110. 
9 1 Quine , W. V., The Roots Of Reference, La Salle , Illinois: Open Court, 1973 , p. 98. 
92 Ibid. , p. 98. 
93 John T. Kearns, "Two Views Of Variables ", Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 
Volume X, Number 2, April 1969 , p. 167. 
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Quine criticized the substitutional interpretation of quantifiers. Since he 
believed that Lesniewski's notion of quantification was substitutional, his 
criticism extended to Lesniewski's logical systems. Kung and Canty attempted 
to defend Lesniewski from such criticism by writing an article titled 
"Substitutional quantification and Lesniewski.an quantifiers" in which they 
asserted that Lesniewski's notion of quantification was neither substitutional 
nor referential, but rather something else. 
The controversy over the interpretation of Lesniewski's quantifiers is 
not yet resolved in the literature. I believe, however, that one must make a 
distinction between an interpretation of Lesniewski's quantifiers and 
Lesniewski's own thoughts on quantification. In this thesis my emphasis is on 
attempting to determine how Lesniewski viewed quantifiers in an effort to 
understand his nominalism. 
I will divide my treatment of Lesniewski.an quantification into two parts: 
In Part I, I will answer three question about Lesniewski's notion of 
quantification, in order to give our discussion a straightforward orientation: 
1) What are quantifiers in Lesniewski's logical systems? 
2) Are quantifiers "primitive" and in what sense are 
quantifiers "primitive" in Lesniewski's logical systems? 
3) What do quantifiers do in Lesniewski's logical systems? 
In Part II, I will attempt to construct a consistent account of 
quantification from the hints he has given us in his published works. 
PART I 
1) What are Lesniewski's quantifiers? 
Lesniewski's Terminological Explanation VII, namely, 
T.E. VIII [A]:: Ais qntf.=:. 
lingr (A) is vrbl. 
Uingr (A) is vrb 2: 
44 
[3B]. B is int(A) :. 
[B]: Bis int (A). :::J. Bis trm :. 
[B,C] : Bis int(A). C is int(A). Bis cnf(C) .:::J. Bis Id(C)94 
"describes" "quantifier" in Lesniewski's logical systems. A quantifier, 
according to this T .E., is a set of brackets , "[]," filled with one or more terms, 
e.g. "[x]," "[x y]," etc. 
There are, however, a series of quotations from various works of 
Lesniewski that seem to indicate that he thought that quantifiers [one must 
remember that Lesniewski officially used only the universal quantifier] were 
just the brackets and not the terms contained within them . 
. . . all or only some variables contained in the quantifier into the 
quantifiers in front of the left ... 95 
... universal quantifier containing variable function-signs ... 96 
... quantifiers containing propositional variables .. . 97 
... universal quantifiers containing propositional variables ... 98 
... the variables occurring in the quantifier ... 99 - which Lesniewski 
precedes by an example similar to [a~ ... KA ... ] (f(a~ ... KA. . . )). 
But there are also places where Lesniewski supports the "definition" of 
quantifier we found in Terminological Explanation VII, for example: 
... P and Q are any meaningful propositions in Protothetic 
containing no variables dependent upon the quantifier .100 
And I have to agree with Luschei when he writes: 
94 Stanislaw Lesniewski , "Fundamentals of a New System of the Foundations of 
Mathematics ", Stanislaw Lesniewski Collected Works, Editors, Stanislaw J. Surma , Jan T. 
Srzednicki, and D.I. Barnett, Trans . M. P. O'Neil , Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers , 1992, pp. 472 and 473. 
95 Ibid., p. 442. 
96 Ibid., p. 445. 
97 Ibid., p. 448. 
98 Ibid. , p. 457. 
99 Stanislaw Lesniewski , "Introductory Remarks to the Continuation of My Article: 
'Grundzuge eines neuen Systems der Grundlagen der Mathematik"', Stanislaw Lesniewski 
Collected Works, Eds. Stanislaw J. Surma, Jan T. Srzednicki , D.I. Barnett, Trans. W. 
Teichmann and S. McCall , Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers , 
1992, pp. 664 and 665. 
mo Ibid., p . 463. 
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" ... A quantifier enclosing no term to bind variables would be useless ... 11101 
I believe that we have given enough evidence to show what quantifiers 
are in Lesniewski's systems; we have developed enough of an understanding to 
be able to "point" to them , even though there might be the lingering suspicion 
that, strictly speaking, the quantifier does, somehow, seem to be just a pair of 
brackets 
2) Are quantifiers primitive and in what way primitive? 
Lesniewski thought that quantifiers were primitive. 
The problem for which I present the solution is the following: 
is it possible to construct a system of logistic recognizing the 
equivalence sign as the only primitive term (in addition, of 
course, to the quantifiers (3)?14 102 
The primitive nature of the universal quantifier, Lesniewski "officially" 
used only universal quantifiers, seems different than the way in which 11E ,11 "=," 
and "part" (cz) are primitive terms for Lesniewski. "c," "=," and "part" (cz) are 
"defined," so to speak, in the way they are used in the axiom in which each first 
appears. The Primitive nature of universal quantifiers seems to demand, 
however, that we "see" some connection between an inscription within the 
quantifier bracket and the inscription (s) in other parts of an axiom or thesis 
which are equiform with that inscription in the quantifier. But Lesniewski does 
not clarify precisely what he means when he writes that quantifiers are 
primitive. 
By calling quantifiers primitive, Lesniewski avoids discussion of the 
relationship between the quantifier and the variously shaped parentheses 
lOl Eugene C. Luschei , The Logical Systems Of Lesniewski, Amsterdam: North-Holland 
Publishing Company , 1962, pp. 181 and 182. 
102 Stanislaw Lesniewski, "Fundamentals of a New System of the Foundations of 
Mathematics " , Stanislaw Lesniewski Collected Works, Eds ., Stanislaw J. Surma, Jan T. 
Srzednicki, and D.I. Barnett, Trans. M. P. O'Neil , Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer 
Acade~ic Publishers, 1992, p. 419. - a quotation from Tarski 's doctoral thesis, a thesis he 
supervised. 
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which surround variables. I will discuss this relationship more fully in my 
treatment ofLesniewski's mature notion of quantification (PART II below), but 
it appears as if the quantifier bracket and the variable bracket are to be seen 
as pointing to the same kinds of things, expressions, expressions whose "type," 
semantic category, is determined by the sh.ape of the parentheses surrounding 
the variable. 
3) What do quantifiers do? 
Our third question -what do quantifiers do in Lesniewski's logical 
systems? - requires two answers. "Internally", quantifiers (more correctly, the 
variable(s) within the quantifier) "point to" or "govern" the inscription(s), the 
term(s), equiform with it (them) in other parts of a thesis. 
Externally, quantifiers point to the actual expressions of some language 
of the same semantic category as indicated by the shape(s) of parentheses 
surrounding the variables which it governs. 
The "internal" relationships between the quantifier and the variable(s) 
within a logical thesis is made explicit by Lesniewski's Terminological 
Explanations and Directives. 
The directives allow no possibility of introducing into the system 
any kind of quantifier other than the previously mentioned 
universal quantifier governing any number of variables.103 
But Lesniewski's failure to carefully define the "external" relationship 
between the quantifier and things outside his logical systems is the source of a 
controversy over interpreting his quantifiers. 
I believe that we can find evidence in both Lesniewski's "initial" and 
mature works to support my contention that Lesniewski's quantifiers range 
lOS Stanislaw Lesniewski, "Introductory Remarks to the Continuation of My Article: 
"Grundzuge eines neuen Systems der Grundlagen der Mathematik" , Stanislaw Lesniewski 
Collected Works, Editors, Stanislaw J. Surma , Jan T. Srzednicki, and D.I. Barnett, Trans. 
W. Teichmann, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers , 1992, p. 664. 
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over the expressions of a language which are a priori arranged into semantic 
categories, that is, his quantifiers can be interpreted substitutionally. 
For hints, let us look at Lesniewski own works first. 
PART II 
1) Quantification In Lesniewski's "Initial Period" 
Our scant knowledge ofLesniewski's notion of quantification begins with 
"A Class of Classes not Subordinated to Themselves" 104 written in his "initial 
period." 
In the early paper [25], where the theorems are not yet given in 
symbolic notation, Lesniewski expressed the universal quantifier 
by saying "prsy kazdem znaczeniu wyrazu 'a"' ("for every 
meaning of the expression 'a"') and the particular quantifier by 
saying "przy pewnym znaczeniu wyrazu 'a"' ("for some meaning 
of the expression 'a"'); i.e. he explicitly referred to the meaning 
of the expression.105 
Lesniewski's uses the word "meaning" in this article and, therefore, may 
mislead us in believing that "meaning" is to be used in the conventional sense. 
I take the conventional sense of meaning to be semantic, that is the 
simultaneous acknowledgment of an inscription being a word which denotes or 
connotes or which does both. Lesniewski , during his "initial" period, believed 
that words both denote and connote. 
There is good evidence, that even during his "initial" period, Lesniewski 
did not use "meaning" in the ordinary sense. I believe that it is best to think of 
"meaning" more syntactically, that is as any "meaningful expression," an 
inscription with meaning, but in the sense of an inscription being an expression 
in any language. 
l0 4 Stanislaw Lesniewski, "Is the Class of Classes not Subordinated to Themselves, 
Subordinated to Itself?" , Stanislaw Lesniewski Collected Works, Editors, Stanislaw J. 
Surma , Jan T. Srzednicki , and D.I. Barnett, Trans. S. J. Surma and J. Wojcik, Dordrecht, 
The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992, pp. 115-128. 
105 Guido Kung, "The Meaning of the Quantifiers in the Logic of Lesniewski", Studia 
Logica, April 1977, p. 319, fn. 9. 
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A few examples will make Lesniewski's use of "meaning" more clear. 
I shall call any object P an object subordinated to class Kif given 
some meaning of the word 'a' the following two conditions are 
fulfilled: (1) Kis a class of(objects) a;2 (2) Pis a. Examples: (A) 
any human being C is subordinated to the class of human beings, 
given that the word 'a' is employed to mean 'human being', both 
the above mentioned conditions are fulfilled, and namely: (1) the 
class of human beings is the class (of objects) a, (2) a human 
being C is a ... 106 
If this were our only example, we might think that "given some meaning 
of the word 'a111 is being used both syntactically and semantically, i.e. that we 
must simultaneously choose an expression to be substituted for 'a,' consider 
the denotation and/or connotation of that expression, and, then, determine the 
truth or falsity of the new expression with the denotation and/or connotation of 
the substituend[um] in mind. But "meaning" is not being used to indicate the 
denotation and/or connotation of the substituend[um]. "Meaning" announces 
the purely syntactic operation of substituting an expression for 'a,' that any 
expression is to be substituted for 'a,' which is a variable in this case. 
Lesniewski assumes that expressions of a language already have a "meaning." 
Our observation is supported more clearly by a second example where 
Lesniewski introduces the semantic notion of interpretation. 
I shall call any object P' an object not subordinated to class K, is 
with no interpretation of the meaning of the word 'a' the 
following two conditions will be fulfilled together: (1) K is a class 
(of objects) a; (2) P' is a (that is if given every possible meaning of 
the word 'a' at least one of these conditions fails to be fulfilled). 107 
The word "meaning" is still used, and still used syntactically as it was in 
our first example, but Lesniewski's introduction of the word "interpretation" 
adds the semantic dimension to his definition that one usually expects from the 
106 Stanislaw Lesniewski, "Is the Class of Classes not Subordinated to Themselves, 
Subordinated to Itself?", Stanislaw Lesniewski Collected Works, Editors, Stanislaw J. 
Surma, Jan T. Srzednicki, and D.I. Barnett, Trans. S. J. Surma and J. Wojcik, Dordrecht, 
The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992, p. 116 . 
l0 7 Ibid ., p. 117. 
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word 11meaning 11 alone. Lesniewski plainly intends that "meaning" be taken as 
an equivalent to "substitution (of an expression of any language)." I believe 
that Lesniewski uses 11meaning 11 in order to assure that possible 
substituendum are expressions of some language; 11substitution 11 by itself 
would not add the necessary connotation Lesniewski desired. That is the 
reason, it seems to me, that he does not use the word "substitution." 
"Meaning, 11 therefore, restricts the domain of quantification to 
"meaningful" expressions of some language and not, as the use of 
11substitution 11 might imply, any inscription whatsoever. Given this restriction, 
"meaningful" need not be taken semantically. An expression of some language 
need not be interpreted prior to substitution. By restricting the domain of 
quantification, however, Lesniewski wants guarantee that what is substituted 
for 1a1 is an expression of some language. 
Additionally, Lesniewski 1s parenthetical explanation in the last 
quotation above supports our interpretation that "meaning" is to be taken 
syntactically. By the use of 11meaning 11 in that parenthetical explanation, 
Lesniewski is simply instructing us to substitute every possible expression for 
the word 1a;1 "interpretation" clearly is to be taken semantically, that is, after 
substituting an expression for 1a 1 we are then to 11read 11 the entire expression 
with the denotation and/or connotation of the substituend[um] in mind. 
In a like manner, Lesniewski uses 11meaningful 11 syntactically. In 11 ••• all 
analogous meaningful theses can be proved ... 11108 , the expression "meaningful 
theses" is being used syntactically, i.e. as an alternative expression for 11well-
formed formula." 
108 Stanislaw Lesniewski, "Fundamentals of a New System of the Foundations of 
Mathematics", Stanislaw Lesniewski Collected Works, Eds., Stanislaw J. Surma, Jan T. 
Srzednicki, and D.I. Barnett, Trans. M. P. O'Neil, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 1992, p. 450. 
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And he uses "meaningful" syntactically in 11 ••• P and Q are any 
meaningful propositions in Protothetic ... 11109 
I could provide further support from Lesniewski's earlier works that 
"meaning" is to be taken syntactically, that Lesniewski's notion of 
"quantification" is substitutional over a domain of expressions of some 
language, but I believe that one more example will be sufficient. Lesniewski 
writes: 
Substituting for the word 'a' its new meaning, that is the expression 'a 
non-universe object', we obtain ... 110 
The reading of this quote, and many others like it in the same article, 
makes sense only if read syntactically. The "new meaning" of'a' in this 
quotation is the expression 'a non-universe object.' The use of the word 
"substituting" along with "meaning" adds significantly to my interpretation. 
"New meaning" is merely an indication that Lesniewski is "substituting" 
another expression for the old "meaning," the old expression. 
Lesniewski also emphasizes the straight forward syntactic exchange of 
expressions in his use of "meaning" through his use of single quotes. Single 
quotes "mark" the variable "space" into which one expression is to be 
substituted for another, i.e. one 'meaning' substituted for another 'meaning.' At 
this point in the article, interpretation is not relevant. Lesniewski's treatment 
of possible substituendum is isolated from any notion of denotation and/or 
connotation of the expressions which are substituted. 
Over and over in this article, Lesniewski uses the word "meaning" to 
announce the syntactic operation of substituting expressions, that is to alert 
109 Ibid., p. 463. 
l10 Stanislaw Lesniewski, "Is the Class of Classes not Subordinated to Themselves, 
Subordinated to Itself? ", Stanislaw Lesniewski Collected Works, Editors, Stanislaw J. 
Surma, Jan T. Srzednicki, and D.I. Barnett, Trans. S. J. Surma and J. Wojcik, Dordrecht, 
The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992, p. 122 
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us to the fact that some expression can be substituted for another. When we 
are to pay attention to the denotation or connotation of a substituend(um), he 
either uses the word "interpretation" or some another word like "compare." He 
consistently maintains the distinction between these two operations. 
2) Lesniewski's Mature Notion of Quantification. 
I will show that Lesniewski's ideas about quantification in his mature 
period are essentially unchanged from his "initial" period. His quantifiers 
continue to range over the expressions of any language; he did not concern 
himself with the "meaning" of the substituend( um) as long as it had "meaning", 
i.e. was an expression of some language. After Lesniewski adopted Husserl's 
notion of semantic categories and incorporated that notion into his own ideas 
about quantification, Lesniewski lost interest in the actual "meaning" of an 
expression; the fact that language includes only those inscriptions with 
"meaning" and the fact that semantic categories a priori order those 
expressions into groups to which reference can be in a logical system, released 
Lesniewski from concern about semantics. He increasingly focused his 
attention on the syntactical development of his logical systems. 
Lesniewski , it should be mentioned, used conventional truth tables to 
provide a formal semantics for Protothetic. Peter M. Simons provides an 
interesting formal semantics for Lesniewski's Ontology. 111 I assume that 
Simons' ideas could be extended to Lesniewski's Mereology, but Mereology, 
according to some commentators, 112 is not, strictly speaking, a logical system. 
111 Peter M. Simons, "A Semantics for Ontology", Dialectica, Vol. 39, No. 3 (1985), pp. 193 -
216. 
112 John T. Keams, "The Contribution Of Lesniewski ", Notre Dame Journal of Formal 
Logic, Volume VIII, Nos. 1&2, (April, 1967 ), p. 65. " ... only Protothetic and Ontology are, 
properly speaking, logical systems. The constants introduced by Mereology are terms used 
for relating objects in the world; they do not affect the grammatical structure oflanguage (in 
contrast, the fundamental terms of a logical system are terms that bring with them a new 
grammatical-syntactical structure). " 
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[Mereology is not considered a logical system because it is built on 
axioms and definitions which contain non logical constants, e.g. "cz" and "Kl."] 
Lesniewski 1s first mention of quantification in his mature period is, oddly 
enough, the place where he refers to his use of "quantifiers" in his "initial" 
period. 
(at the time I did not yet know how to operate with 
quantifiers, 14 and requiring in the colloquial language which I 
was using, some equivalents of expressions of the type (3a). f 
(a)1, 1(3X, a). f(X,a)1, etc. familiar in 1symbolic' language, 15 I used 
corresponding expression of the type 'for some meanings of 
expressions 'X1 and 1a ftX, a)1 and the like, treating these 
complicated expressions in the same way in practice, mutatis 
mutandis, as one would treat the corresponding expressions of 
the types 1(3a). f (a)1, 1(3X, a)1, etc. 113 
• This quotation is interesting, not only because it reflects Lesniewski 1s mature 
thoughts on quantification, but also because, in footnote 14 (quoted 
immediately below), he references and adopts aspects of Peirce's notion of 
quantifiers. 
See: C. S. Peirce, On the Algebra of Logic, 'A contribution to the 
Philosophy of Notation', American Journal of Mathematics, VII, 1885, 
p. 197.114 
Pierce indexed quantifiers and variables in order to indicate the universe 
of discourse which those quantifiers and variables referenced. Lesniewski 
constructed his logical systems in a way to avoid indexing either his quantifiers 
or his variables. A more complete treatment of this footnote to Pierce, though 
important because it supports my contention that Lesniewski viewed 
quantification substitutionally, would interrupt the flow of this section and can 
be, therefore, found in Appendix D. 
113 Stanislaw Lesniewski , "On The Foundations Of Mathematics", Stanislaw Lesniewski 
Collected Works, Eds. Stanislaw J. Surma, Jan T. Srzednicki, D.I. Barnett, Trans. D. I. 
Barnett, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992, p. 203. 
114 Ibid., p. 203. 
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There is nothing in the quotation above which would lead us to believe 
that Lesniewski's "mature" notion of quantification has changed from that of 
his "initial period." As a matter of fact, by making reference to an earlier work 
and by not challenging the views on quantification he held there, Lesniewski, 
himself, supports my assertion that his notion of quantification has not 
changed. And, if Lesniewski had changed his notion of quantification, this 
would have been the most appropriate place to describe that change. Instead, 
Lesniewski provides a symbolically equivalent way of expressing a notion of 
quantification which he was only able to express colloquially during his "initial" 
period. 
In Lesneiwski's published works, I have found nothing to indicate that 
Lesniewski changed his mind about quantifiers. I have found nothing in the 
works of his students to indicate that Lesniewski thought about quantifiers in 
a way other than I have presented above. There is no evidence that 
Lesniewski presented an interpretation of quantification different from what 
we find in his published works, especially when we take into account Peirce's 
influence. 
It was Lesniewski's habit to pay particular attention to the use of 
symbols in logical systems. We need only recall Lesniewski 's treatment of 
Whitehead and Russell's use the assertion sign in "Principia Mathematica" to 
remind ourselves of the weight Lesniewski placed on such detail. Lesniewski 
advised "careful readers" of "Principia" to ignore the assertion sign because 
any attempt to interpret the sign creates so many alternative interpretations 
that the issue of interpretation cannot be clearly decided. 
The variety of interpretations 
... illustrates very well the doubts of a semantic nature ... 
. . . which can repel an interest in 'logistic' for a considerable 
number of scientific workers who are not satisfied just by the 
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delights of writing signs and the transformation of formulas, and 
who - in contrast to the devotees of empty mathematics (and 
such occur) - wish to understand the meaning of the transfol'ffled 
formulas and to know 'of what' and 'what', respectively, 'of what' 
and 'what' it is wished to assert by means of those formulas. 115 
It is difficult to believe that Lesniewski would have introduced an 
obscure or unique notion of quantification into his logical systems without 
carefully preparing a written justification, without having given lectures on 
quantification, without some evidence of that unique notion appearing in the 
works of his students. 
From Lesniewski's point of view, then, quantifiers refer to the 
expressions of actual languages and, therefore, the expressions of these actual 
languages are the things which may be substituted for the variables of his 
logical systems. 
3) Remarks 
The discussion of certain features ofLesniewski's logical systems in this 
Chapter, along with the brief discussion of some of the axioms and definitions of 
Ontology and Mereology found in Chapters II and III above, it is clear that 
Lesniewski did construct his logical systems in order to avoid "talk" about 
things other than quite ordinary objects. In that respect, Lesniewski 
constructed his logical systems to accommodate his nominalistic tendencies. 
That he did not develop a philosophical doctrine to support the construction of 
his logical systems does not diminish his nominalistic motivation. 
Direct knowledge of Lesniewski's nominalism is limited to those issues 
discussed in the preceding Chapters. There is, however, additional, but indirect 
evidence of his nominalism which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
115 Ibid., pp. 194 and 195. 
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Chapter V - Additional Considerations. 
Introduction: 
As we move toward a characterization of Lesniewski's nominalism, 
several additional issues should be addressed. 
I believe that it is necessary to address the fact that Lesniewski never 
characterized himself a nominalist. I will examine Lesniewski's formalism and 
his intuitionism in the first section of this Chapter. These considerations are 
speculative but necessary. 
I also believe that no characterization of Lesniewski is complete without 
a mention of Tadeusz Kotarbinski, a close friend of Lesniewski's who can 
provide several important insights into Lesniewski's mature thinking on 
several topics pertinent to Lesniewski's nominalism. I will consider those 
topics in the second section of this Chapter. 
In the last section of this Chapter, I will consider several recent 
characterizations ofLesniewski's nominalism which appear to be 
exaggerations. 
1) Lesniewski's Formalism and Intuitionism 
Lesniewski's beliefs about what exists in the world and the way in which 
he constructed his logical systems are nominalistic, but he never called himself 
a nominalist. He characterizes himself quite differently? 
I see no contradiction, therefore, in saying that I advocate a 
rather radical 'formalism' in the construction ofmy system even 
though I am an obdurate 'intuitionist' .116 
W. V. Quine, I believe, provides a reason that Lesniewski might call 
himself a formalist and rather than a nominalist. 
116 Stanislaw Lesniewski, "Fundamentals of a New System of the Foundations of 
Mathematics", Stanislaw Lesniewski Collected Works, Eds. Stanislaw J. Surma, Jan T. 
Srzednicki, D.I . Barnett, Trans. M. P. O'Neil, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 1992, p. 487. 
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The three main medieval points of view regarding universals are 
designated by historians as realism, conceptualism, and 
nominalism. Essentially these same three doctrines reappear in 
twentieth-century surveys of the philosophy of mathematics 
under the new names logicism, intuitionism, andformalism. 117 
Quine believes that formalists 11 ••• like the nominalists of old, object to 
admitting abstract entities at all, even in the restrained sense of mind-made 
entities. 11118 Lesniewski's philosophical inclinations fit Quine's description quite 
well. 
The other half of the characterization - the fact that Lesniewski also 
calls himself an intuitionist - is not as easy to deal with. For Quine the modern 
intuitionist shares a belief with his medieval counterpart, the conceptualist, 
that universals exist in the mind. Lesru~ wski does not believe that universals 
exist in the world and he never tells us whether or not he believes they exist in 
the mind. Lesniewski's own characterization of his intuition is, most likely, a 
better guide to what he means by intuition . 
.. .in my system the expressions are treated as a hypothetical-
deductive system, from which it follows that, properly speaking, I 
assert only that those propositions which I call 'theorems' result 
from the propositions which I call 'axioms'. The psychic 'sources' 
of my axioms are my intuitions, which simply means, that I 
believe in the truth of my axioms, but I am unable to say why I 
believe, since I am not acquainted with the theory of causality. 119 
Although Lesniewski wrote this in 1916, there is no reason to believe that his 
attitude changed. Accompanying his 11shift 11 in focus was a shift in attitude. 
He wrote nothing in his 11mature" period to defend his intuition; he simply 
developed his logical systems. 
117 Willard Van Orman Quine, "On What There Is", Universals And Particulars: Reading 
In Ontology, Editor Michael J. Loux, Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1970, 
p. 28. 
118 Ibid. , p. 29. 
119 Stanislaw Lesniewski, "Foundations of the General Theory of Sets." , Stanislaw 
Lesniewski Collected Works, Eds. Stanislaw J. Surma, Jan T. Srzednicki, D.I. Barnett, 
Trans. D. I. Barnett, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992, pp. 
130 and 131. 
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Although Jan Lukasiewicz may not have had Lesniewski in mind, he 
makes an important observation about logicians of the Polish School Of Logic. 
While in practice they adopted the nominalistic standpoint, the 
logicians, as far as I see, have not yet discussed nominalism 
thoroughly enough as a philosophical doctrine. 120 
And, he also observed, that: 
... while we use nominalistic terminology, we are not true 
nominalists but incline toward some unanalyzed conceptualism 
or even idealism.121 
2) Evidence ofLesniewski's Nominalism in the Works ofTadeusz 
Kotarbinski. 
Tadeusz Kotarbinski offers three valuable insights into Lesniewski's 
thinking during his "mature" period. First, Kotarbinski confirms the fact that 
Lesniewski abandoned the notion of connotation. Secondly, Kotarbinski 
provides evidence about Lesniewski's thoughts on epistemology. Thirdly, 
Kotarbinski accepted Lesniewski's "proofs" as proof that universals did not 
exist. I believe that one must understand the close relationship which existed 
between these two men in order to appreciate the importance ofKotarbinski's 
comments on Lesniewski's thinking. 
Kotarbinski and Lesniewski had remarkably similar academic careers 
and, interestingly enough, were even born in the same year, 1886. They both 
received their Ph.D. in 1912 from Lvov University; they both studied with 
Kasimir Twardowski at Lvov University; they both spent the war years (1915-
1918) in Moscow; they were both given teaching post at Warsaw University 
after the war - Kotarbinski in 1918, Lesniewski in 1919; they both began to 
publish works that defined the direction of their mature philosophy in the late 
120 Jan Lukasiewicz, Jan Lukasiewicz Selected Works, Editor L. Borkowski, North-Holland 
Publishing Co., 1970, p. 223. 
121 Jan Lukasiewicz, "Logistic And Philosophy", Jan Lukasiewicz Selected Works, 
Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1970, p. 224. 
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1920's - that is when Kotarbinski published 11Gnosiology11 and Lesniewski began 
publication of "On The Foundations Of Mathematics;" they both taught at 
WarsawUniversityuntil the beginningofthe Second World War. There 
association, unfortunately, ended with Lesniewski's early death in 1939. 
Their respect was mutual. In the preface to the first edition of 
11Gnosiology,11 Kotarbinski acknowledges his intellectual debt to Lesniewski as 
follows: 
But certainly I have learned most from Professor Stanislaw 
Lesniewski. I explicitly indicate this in the various places in the 
text, but those indications pertain only to the most important 
points. But I admit that all my reflections have been imbued 
with the influence of that extraordinary intellect of whose 
priceless gifts favourable fortune has enabled me to partake for 
many years in almost daily contact. I am decidedly a pupil of 
Professor Lesniewski whom I have the pleasure here of 
thanking cordially and respectfully for all he has ever taught 
me.122 
Lesniewski returns the compliment in "On The Foundations Of 
Mathematics" indirectly by quoting lengthy sections from 11Gnosiology, 11 
sections which he offers as accurate statements of his own thinking, and 
directly as follows: 
On the part of one of those authors, Dr. Tadeusz Kotarbinski, 
Professor of Philosophy in the University of Warsaw, my dear 
friend and colleague from student years - my ontology has met 
with a systematic and favourable scientific support from the time 
of its birth. Judging favourably the theory which I had 
concocted, Kotarbinski introduced its elements into his lectures 
at the university for a number of years, and also expressed 
himself decidedly in its favour in his new work entitled 'Elements 
of the Theory of Knowledge, Formal Logic and Methodology' as 
is clear from the section which, full of pride, I introduce shortly. -
From the remote period of our common 'philosophical' past when 
each one of us, pursuing our various aims, was straying along 
blind alleys in semantics and theories of 'truth', whether in a 
pilgrimage to the unpromising land of'free activity' or in 
122 Tadeusz Kotarbinski, Gnosiology. The Scientific Approach to the Theory of Knowledge, 
Trans . Olgierd Wojtasiewicz, Ed. G. Bidwell and C. Pinder, Oxford and New York: 
Pergamon Press, 1966, p. xii. 
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disorganized flight from the formidable spectre of Epimenides' -
The Liar and other fearsome creatures belching contradictions, I 
became accustomed to check my various ideas and theoretical 
projects in scientific discussions with Tadeusz Kotarbinski: I 
availed myself on various occasions of his subtle analytical help; 
I constantly referred to his sharp insights during the 
establishment of various assumptions in the different deductive 
theories which I was constructing; I listened to his relevant and 
fair critical observations and felt concerned whenever I deviated 
too much from his theoretical conceptions ofmy own views. 
The most sincere joy fills my heart in the light of the fact that, as 
far as my ontology is concerned, I have established right to claim 
that in Tadeusz Kotarbinski I have a learned ally. 123 
A) Lesniewski abandoned the notion of connotation. 
Kotarbinski's reference to Lesniewski's thoughts on connotation are 
straightforward. 
While concretism owed its birth to the renunciation of the idea 
that properties inhere in things, Lesniewski freed himself from 
the concept of connotation in the interpretation of the truth of a 
singular sentence with the subject- copula - subjective 
complement structure. Under Mill's influence, he used to state 
that such a sentence is true if the object denoted by the subject 
has the property connoted by the subjective complement. 
Reconsideration of the problem led him, however, to a formula 
free from "connotation" and hence also from "property". That 
formula states that a singular sentence with the subject - copula 
- subjective complement structure (of the type "A is B") is true, if 
the object denoted by the subject is the object denoted by the 
subjective complement.124 
B) Lesniewski believed in "immanent images." 
Lesniewski does not discuss the "existence of immanent images"125 in 
his published works, therefore, Kotarbinski provides us an important insight to 
Lesniewski's mature epistemology. When Kotarbinski discusses "immanent 
images," he writes: 
123 Stanislaw Lesniewski, "On the Foundations of Mathematics" , Stanislaw Lesniewski 
Collected Works, Eds. Stanislaw J. Surma, Jan T. Srzednicki , D.I. Barnett, Trans. D. I. 
Barnett , Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992, pp. 371-373. 
124 Tadeusz Kotarbinski, Gnosiology, The Scientific Approach to the Theory of Knowledge, 
Trans. Olgierd Wojtasiewicz, Ed. G. Bidwell and C. Pinder, Oxford and New York: 
Pergamon Press, 1966, p. 430 . 
125 Ibid., p. 430. 
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Now reism (for Kotarbinski, reism is the belief that objects are 
as we perceive them in the world. - my note.) dared to storm the 
stronghold of that doctrine [the doctrine that "immanent images" 
exist - my note], without availing itself of Lesniewski's assistance, 
since that assistance was in this matter refused.1 26 
What are immanent images? 
Lesniewski, evidently, believed that for us to determine the truth or 
falsity of the existence of something in the world: first, something in the world 
must exist; simultaneously, if we look at that something we have an image of 
it, an immanent image, and, therefore, that that immanent image exists and; 
then, there is a correspondence between the existent thing in the world and our 
immanent image ofit . Knowledge of the world, therefore, is contingent on our 
having images of things in the world and our being able to compare the 
immanent image with a particular thing in the world. This comparison or 
realization that we have an image of something in the world seems to take 
place simultaneously with "seeing" a thing in the world. For the radical realist, 
Kotarbinski, immanent images do not exist, so the existence or non-existence 
of a thing in the world is not contingent on our image of them. 127 
What does this have to do with Lesniewski's nominalism? Would it be 
consistent for a nominalist to believe in immanent images? From 
Kotarbinski's discussion it is difficult to say. Immanent images do not seem 
like universals or a type of abstract entity. It is possible, of course, but not at 
all certain, that Lesniewski believed that immanent images were things, but 
we do not know. The importance ofKotarbinski's reference to Lesniewski's 
belief in immanent images is that we are given a glimpse ofLesniewski's 
epistemology, however slight, which Lesniewski, himself, does not offer in his 
published works. 
126 Ibid. p. 431. 
127 Ibid., p. 85. 
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C) Lesniewski Proved That Universals Do Not Exist 
Kotarbinski, at the time of his life when he wrote 11Gnosiology", was an 
enthusiastic extreme nominalist, though later in his life he viewed nominalism 
as just another interesting hypothesis. As we have learned from our brief 
sketch ofTwardowski's influence on the Polish School, there was a great 
tolerance, even enthusiastic support, for a wide divergence of philosophical 
beliefs amongst the philosophers of the Polish School. There is no reason to 
believe that Lesniewski embraced Kotarbinski's beliefs, any more than we can 
burden Kotarbinski with Lesniewski's beliefs, however, Kotarbinski did believe 
that Lesniewski proved that universals did not exist . 
. . . universals, are the first to fall victim to eliminating analysis as 
carried out by nominalism; it might be said it was only 
concerning them that nominalism succeeded in convincingly 
proving their non-existence by a reductio ad absurdum. 128 
Now, Lesniewski provided proofs, i.e. his first "proof' and his second 
"proof' against the existence of "general" objects. It is important to realize 
that Kotarbinski did not call Lesniewski a nominalist in "Gnosiology". 
3) Recent Characterizations ofLesniewski's Nominalism. 
Most authors who discuss Lesniewski's nominalism mention the 
nominalistic construction and interpretation of his logical systems and the fact 
that he offered "proofs" against the existence of "general" objects. More recent 
characterizations, however, make it appear as if Lesniewski actually 
developed a philosophical doctrine to support his nominalistic tendencies. 
Peter Simons in his 1985 article "A Semantics for Ontology" writes: 
... Lesniewski was a staunch nominalist. Not only did he not 
believe in the existence of abstract entities, but, more than any 
other logician, he went out of his way to avoid doing logic as if 
there were such entities.129 
128 Ibid., p. 55. 
129 Peter M. Simons, "A Semantics for Ontology", Dialectica, Vol. 39, No. 3 (1985), p. 195. 
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And Jan Wolenski in his 1989 book "Logic And Philosophy In The Lvov-
Warsaw School" writes: 
Lesniewski was a declared nominalist.130 
These characterizations seem to imply that Lesniewski developed a 
nominalistic philosophy. The fact that Lesniewski withdrew his criticism of 
specific notions of universals by the time he developed his second "proof' and 
the fact that his logical systems are ontologically neutral, seem to contradict 
such strong characterizations. Lesniewski's philosophical tendencies support 
a limited sort of nominalism. 
130 Jan Wolenski, Logic And Philosophy In The Lvov-Warsaw School, Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1989, p. 194. 
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Summary and Conclusion: 
If a nominalist believes that particular things exist, then Lesniewski 1s 
beliefs do support that aspect ofnominalism. In Lesniewski 1s published works 
and in accounts of his philosophical attitudes, one can say he sympathized 
with those who believed that the world was populated by quite ordinary objects 
and nothing more. It seems clear from his belief in immanent images and his 
belief that language can be used to denote things, that he also believed that 
there is some sort of a correspondence between objects in the world and the 
language we use to talk about the world and, therefore, he believed that there is 
some sort of a correspondence between mind and the world . From this , we can 
infer that Lesniewski believed that we can know things which exist in the 
world, even though he rejected epistemology. He did not, however, develop a 
philosophical doctrine to support these beliefs. As a matter of fact , Lesniewski 
abandoned all discussion of the traditional issues of philosophy. 
If a nominalist believes that only particular things exist, then 
Lesniewski 1s 11proofs 11 against the existence of 11general objects,11 things of a 
different sort than individual objects, can be considered qualified support of 
that aspect of nominalism. Lesniewski, however, did not enter the 
realist/nominalist debate over the existence of universals, so his 11proofs, 11 even 
if they were valid, are 11proofs 11 against the existence of one kind of universal. 
Lesniewski 1s nominalism, then, is a highly qualified sort. Beyond the 
philosophical inclinations mentioned , his nominalism must be inferred from the 
way in which he constructed his logical systems and in the ways in which those 
systems are interpreted. 
Lesniewski constructed his logical systems very precisely in order to 
avoid the possibility of contradiction and, in doing so, he treated the theses of 
his systems like particular things and he believed that his quantifiers actually 
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"pointed" to the expressions of actually existing languages. Although his logical 
systems are said to be ontologically neutral , that is hardly support for a 
nominalist belief that particular things actually exist in the world, it seems 
that he believed that his notion of quantification allowed him to avoid reference 
to things other than particular things , if, in fact, particular things exist. The 
kind of nominalism we can infer from the construction and interpretation of his 
logical systems, then, is as highly qualified as the nominalism which his 
philosophcial inclinations support . 
In the final analysis, it is best to say that Lesniewski was a philosopher 
who created formal language with which one could consistently 11talk.11 about 
objects. A more complete understanding of his philosophy is available only to 
those who would use and expand his logical systems. 
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AppendixA 
Aristotle's Theory Of Universals Applied To Natural Objects. 
For Aristotle a natural object is a particular and a "substance" which is 
a composite of two different "substances", i.e. matter (substratum) and form, 
neither of which exists separately. So, matter and form both actually exist in a 
natural object (in a particular) as two different kinds of "substance" and not as 
aspects of the particular. Aristotle, therefore, rejected a kind ofnominalism 
(fn. 329-330), i.e. what exists is only matter, and he also rejected a kind of 
universalism (fn. 329-330), i.e. what exists is only form. Actually, Aristotle's 
realism might be viewed as an effort to unite nominalism and universalism, 
since he believed that a natural object is a combination of the 'particulars' 
(individuals) of nominalism and the 'formed' (universals) of universalism. 
There are three kinds of substance - the matter, which is a 'this' 
by being perceived (for all things that are characterized by 
contact and not by organic unity are matter and substratum); 
the nature, a 'this' and a state that it moves towards; and again, 
thirdly, the particular substance which is composed of these two, 
e.g. Socrates or Callias.131 
Aristotle also believed that we know matter and form - and, therefore, 
the composite, the natural object or particular - in two different ways. Form is 
known by the thinking part of the soul. 
The thinking part of the soul must therefore be, while 
impassible, capable of receiving the form of an object; that is, 
must be potentially identical in character with its object without 
being the object. Thought must be related to what is thinkable, 
as sense is to what is sensible.132 
Matter is 11known 11 through sensation. 
Since it seems that there is nothing outside and separate in 
existence from sensible spacial magnitudes, the objects of 
thought are in sensible forms, viz. both the abstract objects and 
131 Aristotle, The Complete Works Of Aristotle, 2 Volumes , ed. Jonathan Barnes, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press , 1985, p. 1690. 
132 Ibid. , p. 682. 
66 
all the states and affections of sensible things. Hence no one can 
learn or understand anything in absence of sense, and when the 
mind is actively aware of anything it is necessarily aware ofit 
along with an image; for images are like sensuous contents 
except in that they contain no matter.1 33 
The relationship between what is known, i.e. matter and form, and the 
way we know these things, sensation and thinking, must be carefully 
considered because Aristotle, at times, seems to blur the distinction between 
the outer, i.e. what is known, and the inner, i.e. how we know, it appears as if 
what is universal, that is, form, is really in the mind and not a substance in the 
natural object or particular . 
... the objects that excite the sensory powers to activity, the seen, the 
heard, etc., are outside. The ground of this difference is that what actual 
sensation apprehends is individuals , while what knowledge apprehends is 
universals, and these are in a sense within the soul itself. That is why a 
man can think when he wants to but his sensation does not depend upon 
himself - a sensible object must be there. A similar statement must be 
made about our knowledge of what is sensible - on the same ground, viz. 
that the sensible objects are individual and external.134 
And when Aristotle considers particulars and universals from a 
linguistic point of view, the universal seems to be a general term existing only 
in the mind. This appears to confirm Aristotle's observation that 11 ••• universals 
... are in a sense within the soul itself. 11 
Now of actual things some are universal, other particulars (I 
call universal that which is by its nature predicated of a number 
of things, and particular that which is not; man, for instance, is a 
universal, Callias a particular). 135 
Yet Aristotle clearly writes that: 
h . di .d 1 136 ... no univer sal exists apart from t em vi ua s. 
What Aristotle fails to make absolutely explicit is the difference between 'what 
is universal in a particular', i.e. form, that is something which we know directly 
133 Ibid., p. 686. 
134 Ibid., p. 664. 
135 Ibid ., p. 27. 
136 Ibid., p. 1643 . 
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in thinking, and our knowledge of form as it exists in our mind (in the soul). 
Knowing form in a particular produces knowledge of "what is universal in that 
particular", to be sure, but, when we come to know the identical form in many 
particulars, our knowledge is of the same universal is now a mixture of the 
immediate knowledge of a natural thing with that specific form and our 
knowledge (memory) of past experiences of that form. 
Psychology was in its infancy in Aristotle's time, however, he did 
acknowledge the role of memory on producing an experience: 
... from memory experience is produced in men; for many 
memories of the same thing produce finally the capacity for a 
single experience.137 
Aristotle believed that knowledge of a universal is prior to "knowlege" of 
particulars; his order of knowledge is quite advanced. 
The natural way of doing this is to start from the things which 
are more knowable and clear to us and proceed towards those 
which are clearer and more knowable by nature; for the same 
things are not knowable relatively to us and knowable without 
qualification. So we must follow this method and advance from 
what is more obscure by nature, but clearer to us, towards what 
is more clear and more knowable by nature . 
"Now what is plain and clear at first is rather confused masses, 
the elements and principles of which become known to us later 
by analysis. Thus we must advance from universals to 
particulars; for it is a whole that is more knowable to sen~e-
perception, and a universal is a kind of whole, compr~hending 
many things within it, like parts. Much the same thing ~~pp~ns 
in the relation of the name to the formula. A name, e.g. ~ir~le , 
means vaguely a sort of whole: i~ definitio?- analyses this mto 
particulars. Similarly a child begins by calling all men father, 
and all women mother, but later on distinguishes each ofthem.138 
Hi 
bserva tions of how we come to know natural objects is very sophisticated. 
S O th way we learn 
fi t learn about the world is not the same as e 
The way we rs · to 11see11 
h b"ts of observation are set and we begm 
about the world once a l . how are knowledge of 
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Ibid.- p. 315. 
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universals contributes to our knowledge of universals. A child may call all 
spherical things "ball," until he learns to distinguish between one spherical 
thing and another. 
Conclusion: 
Aristotle believed that natural objects were composite of two different 
kinds of things. This beliefis spread throughout his written works and he 
discusses particulars and universals from many points of view , so that the 
language he uses varies, sometimes slightly, sometimes more radically, in the 
way he treats these two primitive things. Sometimes , as for example in his 
treatment of "substance", he reaches conclusions indirectly almost 
deductively; matter and form almost seem to be hypotheses. 
And , in general, if only the sensible exists, there would be 
nothing if animate things were not; for there would be no 
faculty of sense [i.e. faculty of sense in an animate object - my 
note]. The view that neither the objects of sensation nor the 
sensations would exist [i.e. if there were no sensible things - my 
note] is doubtless true (for they are affections of the perceiver ), 
but that the substrata which cause the sensation should not exist 
even apart from sensation is impossible. For sensation is surely 
not the sensation of itself, but there is something beyond the 
sensation, which must be prior to the sensation; for that which 
moves is prior in nature to that which is moved, ... 139 
The underlying nature can be known by analogy. For as the 
bronze is to the statue, the wood to the bed, or the matter and 
the formless before receiving form to anything which has form, 
so is the underlying nature to substance, i.e. the 'this' or 
existent. 140 
The matter comes to be and ceases to be in one sense, while in 
another it does not. As that which contains the privation, it 
ceases to be in its own nature ; for what ceases to be - the 
privation - is contained within it . But as potentiality it does not 
cease to be in its own nature, but is necessarily outside the 
sphere of becoming and ceasing to be. For ifit came to be , 
something must have existed as a primary substratum from 
which it should come and which should persist in it; but this is its 
own very nature , so that it will be before coming to be. (For my 
definition of matter is just this - the primary substratum of each 
139 Ibid. , p. 1596 . 
140 Ibid ., p . 326. 
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thing, from which it comes to be, and which persists in the 
result, not accidentally.)141 
He also gives examples which make it clear that he derives the existence of 
matter and from directly from evidence provided through the observation of 
natural objects. I summarize: That a sphere (form) and a circle (form) can 
both be bronze demonstrates for Aristotle that different forms can be made of 
. the same kind of matter and that a sphere can be both bronze (matter) and 
wood (matter) demonstrates that one form can be present in different matter; 
these facts provide evidence for Aristotle that natural objects are a 
combination of both form and matter. 
It is clear that Aristotle's "Theory of Universals" is an hypothesis 
meant to give an account of the perceived stability and the instability of 
natural objects. For the purposes of this thesis, it has been sufficient to detail 
the way in which Aristotle regarded natural objects. In our further discussons 
of nominalism, it will be useful to have an exact account of what Aristotle 
believed to exist and how he believed we come to know these existents. 
141 Ibid ., p. 328. 
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AppendixB. 
Lesniewski's First Proof: 
"In order to prove the thesis that no object is 'general', I shall argue by 
reductio ad absurdum. I assume that there is an object Pk which is 'general' 
and it conesponds to 'individual' objects P'1,P'2,P'3, ... , P'n; for every 'individual 
object' P'k, one can always find certain property Ck which is not common to all 
'individual' objects P'l, P'2, P 13, ... , P'n• On the basis of the above the 'general 
object' P'k [misprint in text; should read Pk- my note.] does not possess the 
property Ck (I). The 'individual' object P'k possessing the property Ck does not 
possess the property of not possessing the property Ck. It is so because ifit 
possessed the property of not possessing the property Ck, i.e. ifit was not 
possessed of the property Ck, then it would be contradictory since it would be 
an object both possessing and not possessing the property Ck. The property of 
not possessing the property Ckis not common to all 'individual' objects P'1, P'2, 
P'3, ... , P'n because any 'individual' object P'k possesses the property Ck. 
Consequently the 'general' object P'k [misprint in text; should read Pk- my 
note.] cannot possess the property of not possessing the property Ck, 
therefore it is not possessed of the property Ck, ergo it possesses the property 
Ck (II). From the comparison of the theses (I) and (II) it follows that the 
assumption that any object Pk is 'general' leads to contradiction because it 
implies that this object both possesses the property Ck (I) and does not 
possess it (II). We conclude that the assumption that any object is 'general' is 
false. I believe that the above reasoning demonstrates that no object is a 
universal or general object. 11142 
142 Stanislaw Lesniewski, "The Critique of the Logical Principle of the Excluded Middel", 
Stanislaw Lesniewski Collected Works, Eds. Stanislaw J. Surma, Jan T. Srzednicki, D.I. 
Barnett, Trans. S. J. Surma and J. Wojcik, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1991, pp. 51 and 52. 
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AppendixC. 
Lesniewski's Second Proof 
11 
••• to all those who, by reason of the meaning they give to expressions of 
the type 'general object with respect to objects a1, are inclined to state the 
proposition 1if Xis a general object with respect to objects a, Xis b, and Y is a, 
then Yis b', I wish to state here that this proposition entails the proposition 1if 
there exist at least two different a, then a general object with respect to objects 
a does not exist', in accordance with the following schema: 
(1) if Xis a general oQject with respect to oQjects a, Xis b, also Y is a, then Y is 
b. (assumption) from (1) it results, that 
(2) if Xis a general object with respect to objects a, Xis different from Z, and Z 
is a, then Z is different from Z, 
and 
(3) if Xis a general object with respect to objects a, Xis identical with Z, and Y 
is a, then Y is identical with Z; 
from (2) it follows, that 
( 4) if Xis a general object with respect to objects a, and Z is a, then Xis 
identical with Z, 
from ( 4) however, that, 
(5) ifX is a general object with respect to objects a, Z is a, and Y is a, then (Xis 
a general object with respect to objects a, Xis identical with Z, and Y is a); 
from (5) and (3) it follows, that, 
(6) ifX is a general object with respect to objects a, Z is a, and Y is a, then Y is 
identical with Z, 
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from (6) however, that if there exist at least two different a, then a general 
object with respect to objects a, does not exist. 11143 
143 Stanislaw Lesniewski, "On the Foundations of Mathematics", Stanislaw Lesniewski 
Collected Works, Eds. Stanislaw J. Surma, Jan T. Srzednicki, D.I. Barnett, Trans. D. I. 





On page 53 above, I make reference to a footnote, footnote 14, on page 
203 of "Stanislaw Lesniewski Collected Works" which directs our attention to 
Peirce. 
See: C. S. Peirce, On the Algebra of Logic, 'A contribution to the 
Philosophy of Notation' , American Journal of Mathematics, VII, 1885, 
p. 197.144 
This footnote is mentioned in almost every article which discusses 
Lesniewskian quantification. Commentators, however, generally quote from 
an article by Tarski in which the same reference is made to the same Peirce 
article as Lesniewski makes above, but Tarski's reference is believed to have 
included an actual quotation from the Peirce article and not just a reference to 
page 197 of the article. Commentators usually mention the fact that 
Lesniewski, in alaterwork145, actually quotes the entire Tarski reference, 
including what is taken to be an actual quotation form the Peirce article. 
Tarski's reference, which includes what is believed to be an actual quotation for 
Peirce, is found in footnote 3 of his article , which reads as follows: 
3 In the sense of Peirce (see Peirce, C. S. (58a), p. 197) who gives this 
name to the symbols 'II' ( universal quantifier) and 'I' (particular or 
existential quantifier) representing abbreviations of the expressions: 'for 
every signification of the terms ... ' and 'for some signification of the 
terms ... '146 
For the sake of completeness, I provide the sentence in the body of 
Tarski's article to which footnote above is attached: 
144 Ibid., p. 203. 
145 Stanislaw Lesniewski, "Fundamentals of a New System of the Foundations of 
Mathematics ", Stanislaw Lesniewski Collected Works, Eds . Stanislaw J. Surma , Jan T. 
Srzednicki , D.I. Barnett, Trans. M. P. O'Neil, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers , 1992 ,pp. 419 and 420 . 
146 Alfred Tarski, Logic. Semantics, Meta-Mathematics. Hackett Publishing Company, 
1983, p. 1, fn. 3. 
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The problem of which I here offer a solution is the following: is it 
possible to construct a system of logistic in which the sign of equivalence is 
the only primitive sign (in addition of course to the quantifiers3) 147 
This sentence is a statement of the problem Tarski addressed in his 
doctoral thesis, a thesis written under the direction of Lesniewski - Tarski was 
the only doctoral student Lesniewski ever supervised. Although it is obvious 
from the quote, it is important to mention that Tarski considered quantifiers to 
be primitive signs. 
Let us return to the Lesniewski's and Tarski's reference to Peirce. 
I have not found a commentator who mentions that Tarski actually 
misquotes Peirce. Nowhere on page 197, as a matter of fact nowhere in 
Peirce's article, do we find the phrases '"for every signification of the terms .. . 111 
and '"for some signification of the terms ... "'. AB a matter of fact, the only 
possible section on page 197 of Peirce's article to which Tarski (and 
Lesniewski) could reasonably be referencing, is the "4th" "step" of Peirce's 
instructions for manipulating indices , namely, instructions for 11 ••• making the 
indices refer to the same collections of objects ... ". 
On pages 194 and 195 of Peirce's article, there are phrases similar to 
the ones Tarski quotes: 
Thus LiXimeans thatxis •true of some one of the individuals denoted by 
i or LiXi = Xi+ Xj + xk + etc. In the same way , ffixi means that xis true of 
all these individuals, or ffixi = XiXjXk, etc.148 
But there are no phrases closer than these to the ones Tarski attributes 
to Peirce. 
I believe that both Lesniewski and Tarski refer to Peirce, not so much 
for the phrases which Peirce uses to translate the symbolic logic tokens for 
147 Ibid., p . 1. 
148 Peirce , C. S., "On the Algebra of Logic: A Contribution To The Philosophy Of Notation ", 
American Journal Of Mathematics, Vol. VII , 1885 , p. 197. 
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universal and particular quantifiers into ordinary language, but because they 
both actually make use of Peirce's instructions for " ... making the indices refer 
to the same collections of objects ... " in their own works on logic. 
In order to see the relevance of the Peirce reference to Lesniewski's 
notion of quantification, I have used Peirce's notation to notate Lesniewski's 
Axiom of Ontology. Lesniewski's Axiom of Ontology using Peirce's notation 
would look something like this: 
[IT:xen ITx'enJ:: Xen E x'en .: = :. -. [ITYenJ -. ( Yen E Xen): 
[IT Yen IT Zen] Yen E Xen. Zen E Xen. =>. Yen E zen: 
[ITYen] Yen E Xen. =>•Yen E x'en 
Peirce used indices to make explicite the collection of things outside his 
system to which his quantifiers "pointed". In my example, each variable is 
indexed, actually double-indexed (11indices ofindices"149 for Peirce). Ifwe 
assume that Lesniewski quantified over expressions of any language which are 
a priori ordered into semantic categories, then first index, "e" of my example 
symbolizes expressions of any language, the widest range of things which can 
be subsituted for the variable. The second index, "n", symbolizes the semantic 
category of the expression (nouns) which can be substituted for the particular 
variables of this axiom. By specifying the semantic category the range of 
quantification is further restricted to noun expressions; for Lesniewski, the 
functor "e" required two expressions of the semantic category of nouns. 
It is important to note that, for Peirce, variables were always to be 
replaced by tokens.150 Peirce's use of the word "token" is very close to 
Lesniewski's use of the word "expression" (another reason for choosing "e" as 
the first index in the Peirce notated Axiom of Ontology above). I assume that 
neither Lesniewski nor Tarski restricted their reading of Peirce to page 197 of 
149 Ibid ., p. 199. 
150 Ibid ., p. 199. 
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the above quoted article. I assume that they read and understood the entire 
article and, perhaps other articles of Peirce as well. 
What we realize from this analysis is that Lesniewski could and did drop 
the first index by simply restricting his universe of discourse to expressions . 
Lesniewski was able to avoid using the second index and , therefore, the use of 
indices altogether by using variously shaped parenthesis to mark the semantic 
categories of the variables of his logical systems . 
. . . I adopted from my 1theory oftypes 1, ••• ,a variability in parentheses 
that depends upon semantical categories of the particular expressions 
involved.151 
The phrases Tarski seems to quote from Peirce 1s article are not direct 
quotations at all . When we realize that the Peirce footnote appears, in Tarski 1s 
original works, in either Polish or French, then we understand that those 
phrases, 111For every signification of the terms 111 and 111for some signification of 
the terms 111 couldjust as well be translated into english as 11for every meaning 
of the terms 11 and 11for some meaning of the terms 11, respectively. These 
phrases represent precisely Lesniewski 1s notion of quantification during his 
11initial 11 period. By quoting Peirce, therefore, Tarski simply wishes to express 
the concurrance of Lesniewski 1s and Peirce 1s notions of quantification. 
Ifwe do not take Peirce 1s indices as an alternate way to describe both 
Lesniewski 1s and Tarski 1s range of quantification, then the fact that both 
Lesniewski and Tarski quoted Peirce makes no sense. If we cannot index 
Lesniewski 1s variables to expressions and semantic categories, again, quoting 
Peirce makes no sense. 
151 Stanislaw Lesniewski, "Fundamentals of a New System of the Foundations of 
Mathematics ", Stanislaw Lesniewski Collected Works, Editors , Stanislaw J . Surma, Jan T. 
Srzednicki, and D.I. Barnett , Trans. M. P. O'Neil , Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 1992, p. 453. 
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After reading Peirce's article, Lesniewski, it seems, not only understood 
that variables needed to be indexed to a specified range of expressions, but also, 
ifhe choose a fixed universe of discourse for all the varibles of his logical 
systems, then no index was required. Dropping the index made his own 
systems less cumbersome. Lesniewski's use of variously shaped parenthesis 
to enclose variables that could only be replaced by expressions of a certain 
semantic category seems to be a more elegent and a more "iconical" way of 
showing a correspondence between the semantic categories of any language 
and the semantic categories ofLesniewski's logical systems. Lesniewski's 
methods of "indexing" variables is syntactically superior because his variables 
are, then, not burdened with any other duty than as place holders and as 
primitive expressions of the particular semantic category indicated by the 
shape of the parentheses sun·ounding them. Indices, it seems to me, are not 
as simple syntactically as Lesniewski's parentheses; indices seem to confuse 
the notion of simple substitution. 
That Peirce had a significant influence on the development of 
Lesniewski's logical systems is further supported in Lesniewski's mature 
works by a continuous reference to words, terms, expressions, and, in general, 
to linguistic entities. Lesniewski's mature writing makes absolutely no sense, 
unless the syntactic development of symbols in his logical systems somehow 
finds a correspondence to the expressions of natural language. 
Certain other similarities to Lesniewski's logical systems appear in 
Peirce's article and, although they are not pertinent to our discussion, I 
mention these similarities because they are interesting; they show, I believe, 
that Peirce's influence on Lesniewski's intellectual development was greater 
that a simple reference might indicate. 
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Peirce treated terms taken in the distributive sense separately from 
terms treated in a collective sense. Though it might seem that 11externally 11 
Peirce's quantifiers 11pointed to11 objects in the world, we see in the quote below, 
that that opinion is a bit too simplistic. 
The index [quantifier - my note] asserts nothing; it only says 11There! 11 
It takes hold of our eyes, as it were, and forcibly directs them to a 
particular object, and there it stops. Demonstrative and relative 
pronouns are nearly pure indices, because they denote things without 
describing them; so are the letters on a geometrical diagram, and the 
subscript numbers which in algebra distinguish one value from another 
without saying what those values are. 152 
Peirce attempts to describe the 11primitive 11 nature of quantifiers, not by 
saying that they attempt to provide an absolute correspondence between 
things in the world and the variables of his logical systems, but rather that 
whatever quantifiers do, they do it 11without saying what those values are". 
152 Peirce, C. S., "On the Algebra of Logic: A Contribution To The Philosophy Of Notation", 
American Journal Of Mathematics, Vol. VII, 1885, p. 181. 
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